Definitions HQ

Existence (n.) begins ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠for a fact when all its conditions are present.

Existence (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠immediate in such a way that it is mediated only by the vanishing of mediation.

Existence (n.) as ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠"being-there" is far from the highest predicate — too lowly for the Idea and unworthy of God.

Existence (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠really the perversion of every determinateness into its opposite — and only this alienation supports the whole.

Existence (n.) comes ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠from the ground and goes to the ground, Hegel puns: its ruin is also its return to the totality that sustains it.

Existence (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠'being in the world' which is to say the perception of any given thing as part of the whole world of things and processes which relate and interact with the 'thing'.

Existence (n.) that ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠is bad can be judged only if the concept is presupposed; start from existence and acephalous animals 'prove' that people can live without brains.

Existence (n.) in ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠Hegel's sense is a world with nothing hidden behind it: the inner basis of things is a necessity whose full and only expression is in the outer world.

Existence (n.) comes ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠from existere and names a state of having emerged: being that has come forth from its ground — and the ground does not stay behind but is this very passage into existence.

Existence (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠a world of interdependence, an infinite connectedness of grounds with what is grounded — where each existent is inwardly reflected and at once shining into another.

Existence (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not contained in the concept of contingent things: the hundred dollars in my wallet have no necessary tie to the hundred dollars in my mind, so Kant's objection holds for them, though not for the whole.