Happiness (n.) in each instance comes for the first time.
Happiness (n.) is not an accident of being, since being is risked for happiness.
Happiness (n.) lives in a satisfied soul, not in one that has extirpated its needs — a castrated soul.
Happiness (n.) once experienced may leave behind the art of knowing how to do without it.
Happiness (n.) is accomplishment, worth more than ataraxy; pure existing is ataraxy.
Happiness (n.) hides a misery within its illusions and offers a mere contentment, which children must learn to recognize.
Happiness (n.) suffices to itself through the "not sufficing to oneself" proper to need — it satisfies needs rather than suppressing them.
Happiness (n.) as time resting on its hour, the marvelous moment that deserves to last, is still attached to the idea of rest, and so to substance.
Happiness (n.) alone or virtue alone injures Reason; the perfect Good needs the one who is worthy of happiness to be able to hope for it.
Happiness (n.) puts the I above being: it can sacrifice its pure and simple being to happiness — and in Desire it can sacrifice even its happiness.
Happiness (n.) is always imperfect: its murmur is the restlessness and insomnia of sensibility, the ego never quite coinciding with itself.
Happiness's (n.) independence is the original pattern of all independence — and yet it always depends on a content: the joy or pain of breathing, looking, eating.
Happiness (n.) as the so-called animal principle is all that keeps plurality alive in the kingdom of ends: where every will wishes to be reason, multiplicity rests only on the hope of happiness.