Life (n.) is, along with death, not a properly scientific concept but rather a political concept, which as such acquires a political meaning precisely only through a decision.
Life (n.) is not a biological concept but a political one.
Life (n.) is politicized the moment it occupies this space, when it is exposed to death.
Life (n.) is never defined as such in our culture, only split — bios and zoe, public and private, vegetative and relational — and perhaps its very undecidability is why it must be decided politically each time.
Life (n.) in general has become a 'scientific fact' so generic it can mean a sperm cell or a bear — and it is this blank that the Church made sacred and bioethics made its key term.
Life (n.) in its immediacy, Deleuze said, is contemplation without consciousness.
Life (n.) is this very impossibility of experiencing oneself, of making one's existing and one's being coincide — the secret of Henry James's novels: we can live only because we have missed our life.
Life (n.) in the West is not a medical concept but a philosophical-political one: the Hippocratic writings fill ten volumes and use the word zoe just eight times.
Life (n.) as a generic entity is a 'spectral' notion, Illich said: it starts with Jesus saying not 'I am a life' but 'I am Life', and has become the sacred object of churches and states alike.
Life (n.) in modern languages is one word whose opacity grows in proportion to how sacred its referent has become.
Life (n.) for Plotinus is a kind of thought: every life is a certain thinking, some dimmer, some more luminous.