Ought (n.) exists because what ought necessarily to happen frequently does not happen.
Ought (n.) expresses a possible action whose ground is nothing but a mere concept, whereas a natural action is always grounded in an appearance.
Ought (n.) is the voice of the imperative, a law of freedom that says what should happen even though perhaps it never does happen.
Ought (n.) expresses how a faculty can be determined by mere ideas; how what has never yet happened can cause actions in the sensible world we cannot comprehend at all.
Ought (n.) has no significance whatever in nature: we can no more ask what ought to happen there than what properties a circle ought to have.
Ought (n.) is properly an "I would," valid for every rational being whose reason acted unhindered; only for beings also moved by sensibility does it sound as "ought."
Ought (n.) presupposes that something which did not happen nevertheless should have happened — so that its cause in appearance was not so decisive as to leave no causality in our choice.
Ought (n.) can never be produced by natural grounds and sensible stimuli: however many push me to will, they yield only a conditioned willing, against which reason's ought sets a measure and goal.