Representation (n.) is a pure present with no ties to time — a void of time taken for eternity.
Representation (n.) of things as they are in themselves requires that I know how to give what I possess.
Representation (n.) wrests the past and the future back into presence — as if, in its diachrony, time returned to a failed eternity.
Representation (n.) is not making present again but reducing to the instant of thought everything that seems independent of it.
Representation (n.) is a recommencement of the present which, in its "first time," is already for the second time.
Representation (n.) is not the original gesture of the human soul but a choice; the supposedly sovereign mind rests on a mentality.
Representation (n.) invents the goal in advance and lets the groping hand win it a priori; it discovers, properly speaking, nothing before itself.
Representation (n.) dissolves the other into the same: every representation is at bottom a constitution by me.
Representation (n.) empties oneself of subjective substance and anaesthetizes enjoyment; Spinoza, imagining this anaesthesia limitless, conjures away separation.
Representation (n.) is a kind of 'intelligibility' that tames the otherness of the other by translating it into the terms of the same.
Representation (n.) is the one relation where the other never determines the same: the thinker submits to the object "gracefully," as though its surprises had been anticipated.