Self-consciousness (n.) is enough to concede that something necessarily exists — an existence is given to me in myself.
Self-consciousness (n.) must combine every different empirical consciousness into one — the absolutely first synthetic principle of all our thinking.
Self-consciousness (n.) made into a thing breeds the most natural and seductive illusion: mistaking the unity in a synthesis of thoughts for a unity perceived in the thinker.
Self-consciousness (n.) cannot divide itself, because the subject that thinks is at once its own object — to itself it is absolute unity, though seen from outside it may show composition.
Self-consciousness (n.) seems to know itself through the categories, but rather knows the categories through itself: I cannot cognize as an object that which I must presuppose to cognize any object at all.
Self-consciousness (n.) of my existence in time is bound up identically with consciousness of something outside me: it is experience, not fiction, that joins outer sense to inner.
Self-consciousness (n.) or "I am conscious of myself" is an indubitable fact no one can explain: how can I, who think, become my own object and differentiate myself from myself?
Self-consciousness (n.) lets me distinguish my existence as a thinker from things outside me, including my body, but does not tell me whether I could be conscious of myself at all without those outer things — whether I could exist merely as a thinking being, without being human.