Sensibility (n.) realizes the understanding at the very moment it restricts it.
Sensibility (n.) is not a confusion of representations but the condition of consciousness.
Sensibility (n.) is not confused thinking — not a blurred view of things in themselves under a heap of marks — but a different source of cognition altogether.
Sensibility (n.) is derived intuition (intuitus derivativus): it does not create its object but depends on the object's existence and on being affected by it.
Sensibility (n.) hides the mystery of its own origin: we know ourselves only through inner sense, as appearance, and so we use an unsuitable tool to look for something that would not be appearance.
Sensibility (n.) is our receptivity: the capacity to acquire representations through the way we are affected by objects; it alone gives us intuitions.
Sensibility (n.) could exist whole without belonging to anyone: much empirical consciousness in my mind, but separated, not belonging to one consciousness of myself — which is impossible.
Sensibility (n.) and understanding (n.) are the two stems of human cognition, perhaps sprung from a common but to us unknown root: through the first objects are given, through the second thought.
Sensibility (n.) is itself limited by the understanding: appearances concern not things in themselves but only how things appear to us on account of our subjective constitution.
Sensibility (n.) is both the source of real cognitions and the ground of error: subordinated to the understanding it supplies objects; meddling in its action it misleads.
Sensibility (n.) is a receptive capacity. Time and space are forms of sensibility in that only because they are modes of experience in the way that they are is the understanding able to use this receptive capacity to assess objects.