Substance (n.) is what a relation looks like when it holds still.
Substance (n.) is a term of relation grown absolute, having swallowed everything that was the being of relation.
Substance (n.) is one because it is stable; it is fully actual and charged with nothing.
Substance (n.) is the habit of mind that shatters the world into terms and then has to glue them back together with “relations.”
Substance (n.) keeps no private room away from accidents: every accident adds substance, which mixes into what was already there.
A Substance (n.) cannot become, because it has been resolved in advance; it is in itself, coherent with itself, and incapable of opposing itself.
Substance (n.) would be a thing so perfectly in tune with itself that no part could ever lag behind another, which is why nothing real is a substance.
Substance (n.) is the quiet assumption monists and dualists share: that being exists, already individuated, before every operation and every genesis.
Substance (n.) theories, whether of rest and motion or essence and accident, know only alteration and stable equilibrium, never metastability.
Substance (n.) is what being looks like once it has finished happening; make it the model of being and you can no longer say how anything came to be.
Substance (n.) is the old prejudice that to be fully real a thing must need nothing else; yet the energy that drives a pendulum cannot exist without a second term.
A Substance (n.) keeps its individuality in the steadiest state its energy allows; the proof is that a foreign seed cannot change it, while it can change others.
Substance (n.) is a by-product: individuation happens to a system, and what we call substance is what that system produces from a first singularity.