Definitions HQ

Substance (n.) changing ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠under you no more makes two persons than wearing other clothes today makes two men.

Substance (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠something of which we have no idea what it is, only a confused, obscure idea of what it does.

Substance (n.) was ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the word invented to hold up accidents, once these were imagined as real beings needing something to inhere in.

Substance (n.) has ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠no abstract names, and that silence is mankind's confession that it has no idea of the real essences of substances.

Substance (n.) and ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠inherence, put into plain English, are "under-propping" and "sticking on" — and the translation shows how much they really explain.

Substance (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠a word for something-I-know-not-what: we cannot imagine qualities floating free, so we suppose a support beneath them we have no idea of.

Substance (n.) gives ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠us ideas that are false in the greatest part, if not all, once we take them to show the real essence on which all properties depend.

Substance (n.) can ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠belong to two persons in turn: what was part of me a moment ago may soon become a real part of someone else.

Substance (n.) can ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠never be fully known, because its qualities are powers, and to know them all you would have to try it against every other substance in every way.

Substance (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠just the kind of idea nature should have given us if it gave any — one our faculties cannot procure — and yet it is exactly the one we lack.

Substance (n.) of ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠every kind has something in it that manifestly baffles our understanding — so incomprehensibility is no argument against existence.

Substance (n.) affords ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠so few certain general propositions, and of so little moment, that our certain general knowledge of it may justly be looked on as almost none at all.

Substance (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the philosopher's tortoise: the world rests on an elephant, the elephant on a tortoise, and the tortoise on — something, he knew not what.

Substance (n.) in ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠general propositions is for the most part trifling when those propositions are certain, and uncertain when they are instructive.

Substance (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the supposed or confused idea that always comes first in our idea of a thing: add a dull whitish colour, weight, hardness and fusibility to it and you have lead.

Substance (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the European philosopher's elephant: the Indian sage needed an elephant and a tortoise to hold up the earth, when the word "substance" would have done it just as well.

Substance (n.) names ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠are uncertain for the opposite reason to moral words: not because they lack a standard, but because their standard is Nature, which we can know only imperfectly or not at all.

Substance (n.) ideas ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠are copies of patterns outside us, so they may fail; their only warrant is to join what has once been found united in nature — for whatever once had an union in nature may be united again.

Substance (n.) applied ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠alike to God, spirits and body either makes them differ no otherwise than a tree and a pebble, as bare modifications of one stuff, a very harsh doctrine, or else the word has scarce one clear signification, let alone three.