action

animal

anthropophorous

bildung

boredom

contradiction

desire

freedom

Japan

marxism

master - slave dialectic

reason

recognition

satisfaction

self-consciousness

sentiment of self

slave

subjectivity

West

wisdom

work

nationality

French

occupation / innovator as

university teacher

innovator in the field of

philosophy

philosopher

is the transformation of what is real. Man can be satisfied only by action.

Man can be satisfied only by action. Now, to act is to transform what is real. And to transform what is real is to negarc the given. (Kojeve 1934 : 54)

is an entity which does not suffer alienation, but therefore, also possesses no consciousness enabling it to rise above itself in order to come back toward itself. It has no distance with respect to itself.

Accordingly, the Animal attains only Selbsrgefilht, Sentiment of. self, but nor Selbsr-&erausstsein, Silf-Consciousness rh* is. it c annot speak of itself, it cannot say ,,I.. . .' And this is so because the Animal does nor really transcind itself as giaen-i.e., as body... it does not rise aboae itself in order to come' bacft toward itseifj it has no distance with respect to itself in order to contewpht... itself. (Kojeve 1934 : 39)

is a kind of self-forming accomplished through work. It is characterized in that it transforms man via his transformation of the world.

Work rs Bildung, in the double meaning of the word: on the one hand, it forms, transforms the World, humanizes it by making it more adaprcd to A4an... on the other, it Eansforms, forms, educates man, it humanizes him by bringing him into greater conformity with the idea that he has of himself, an idea that-in the beginning-is only tn abstract idea, an ideal. (Kojeve 1934: 52)

is a sense brought about by the self-negation of not-acting. It is a self-negation that is only possible to those who act.

to be as sein, as given, naryrat being. Hence, it is to fall into decay, to become brutish... and this metaphysical truth is revealed to Man through the phenomenon of boredom: the Man who-like a thing, like an animal, like an angel-remains idendcal to himself, does not negate, does not negate himself-i.e., does not act, is bored. And only Man can be bored. (Kojeve 1934 : 54)

1s 2wareness moves historical evolution. To become aware of a contradiction is necessarily to want to remove it.

Now, this latter must eventually perceive the contradiction implied in his existence. And, generally speaking, the awareness of. r contradiction 's whar moves human. historical evolution. To become aware of a contradiction is necessarily to want to remove it. (Kojeve 1934 : 54)

is human only if one desires not the body, but the desire of the other, that is, that he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved,' or, rather, 'recognized' in his human value.

Thus, in the relationship between man and women, for example, Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other... if he wants 'to possess' or 'to assimilate' the Desire taken as Desire-that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved,' or, rather, 'recognized' in his human value, in his reality as a human individual. (Kojeve 1969 : 6) . . . Therefore, to desire the Desire of another is in the final analysis to desire that the value that I am or that I 'represent' be the value desired by the other: I want him to 'recognize' my value as his value, I want him to 'recog:dze' me as an eutonomous value. In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire-the Desire that generates Self-Consciousness, the human reality-is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition.' (Kojeve 1969 : 7)

is to want to substitute oneself for the value desired by this desire.

Now, to desire a Desire is to want to substitute oneself for the value desired by this Desire. For without this substitution, one would desire the value, the desired object, and not the Desire itself. (Kojeve 1969 : 7)

is not simply freedom of thought. It is the slave who tries to tell himself he is free merely by virtue of such an abstraction of freedom.

The first of these slave's ideologies is stoicism. The slave tries to persuade himself that he ts actually free simply by knowing thet he is free-that is, by having this abstraction of freedom. (Kojeve 1934 : 53)

is, despite the end of history that is encountered in the west, a little surplus in which, through such acts of snobism as drinking tea in a nice way, life still has a meaning.

Then there is the Kojevian Japan. First for Kojeve the end of history was Russia and America, the realization of the French Revolution. Then he noticed that something was missing. He found the answer in Japan, in the little surplus. If everything only functions, as in America, you would kill yourself. In the snobbism, drinking tea in a nice way, he found that life still had a meaning.'

is that which acts not to subjugate a thing, but to subjugate a desire.

To be human,men must act not for the sake of subjugating a thing, but for the sake of subjugating another Desire (for the thing). (Kojeve 1934 : 39)

is the being that 'feeds' on desires as an animal feeds on real things.

Man 'feeds' on Desires as an animal feeds on real things. And the human I, realized by the active satisfaction of its human Desires, is as much a function of its 'food' as the body of an animal is of its food. (Kojeve 1969 : 6)

is a method which provides a schema for understanding history as a movement from class conflict to a society of rigorous equality without classes.

For Kojeve, Marxism provides the schema for understanding history as a movement from class conflict (the master/slave conflict at the level of collectivities) to a society without classes. The freedom of a rigorous equality is the freedom of citizens equal before a law they have made themselves.

is the idea that it is by work in the master's service performed in terror that the slave frees himself from the terror that enslaved him to the master.

It is by work in the Master's service performed in terror that the Slave frees himself from the terror that enslaved him to the Master.] (Kojeve 1934 : 26)

is likely something which has unreasonable origins.

Kojeve's reading of Hegel is that reason might have 'unreasonable' origins' (Marks Gilles Deleuze 16).

is desiring the desire of another. It is to want to substitute oneself for the value desired by this desire.

is characterized by non-acting. It is desiring nothing, becoming nothing, wanting no change, maintaining an identity to oneself.

would be the man who wants nothing, who desires nothing: he wants to change nothing, either in himself or outside of himself... therefore he does not act. He simply is and does not become... he maintains himself in identity to himself and he ls satisfied in and by this identity. (Kojeve 1969 : 77)

is the liquefaction of every stable support, of everything fixed or stable, of the slavish consciousness.

By this fear, the slavish consciousness melted internally... it shuddeied deeply and werything fixed-or-stable trembled in'it. Now, this por. oni versal [dialectical] movement, this absolute liquefaction'of every stable-support, is the simple-or-undivided essential-realirv of sef(Kojeve 1934 : 22)

is one who tries to persuade himself that he ts actually free simply by knowing thet he is free-that is, by having this abstraction of freedom.

is that which in order to become, man must act not to subjugate a thing, but to subjugate a desire.

To be human, men must act not for the sake of subjugating a thing, but for the sake of subfugating another Desire (for the thing). (Kojeve 1934 : 39)

is defined by the stoics as one perfectly satisfied by what he is.

Thus the Stoics, for example, for whom the idea of the Wise Man plays a central role and who, in contrasr to plato, aserted the possibility and even the reality of such a men, defne him as the man who is perfectly satisfied by what he is. (Kojeve 1969 : 76)

Alexandre Kojeve

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Alexandre Kojeve