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is grounded in the principle that not only are equals equal (I.E homogeneity) but unequals will not be treated equally (i.e. The eradication of heterogeneity).

Every actual democracy rests on the principle that not only are equals equal but unequals will not be treated equally.Democracy requires, therefore, first homogeneity and second if the need arises elimination or eradication of heterogeneity. Carl Schmitt

is, in the friend/enemy distinction, such that the hated other [is] needed to create the solidarity of the homogeneous self.

the hated other [is] needed to create the solidarity of the homogeneous self.' (martin Jay)

is not necessarily morally evil or aesthetically ugly... he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transaction. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger with whom existential conflict is a possibility.

. . . The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly... he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transaction. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger... and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are always possible.' (p. 27)

is revealing of who you are. Tell me who your enemy is and I'll tell you who you are.

Tell me who your enemy is, and I will tell you who you are. Carl Schmitt

is whoever is in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.

friend and enemy,' that is to say that the enemy is whoever is 'in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.' (net)

is as an attack on liberalism unforeseen and sudden situations render unstable any system.

Schmitt's political theory was founded on the idea of exception (Ausnahmezustand) from where he launched an attack on liberalism. According to Schmitt unforeseen and sudden situations in the political render unstable any system build on pre-planned responses and fixed legal codes. The political rests on a fundamental contingency and basic conflict hence it cannot adopt apriori rules of procedure. Liberalism disregards this inherent contingency and does not account for exception in its construal of rules' (NET)

is more interesting than the rule. The rule proves nothing... the exception proves everything. In the exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition.

The exception is more interesting than the rule. The rule proves nothing... the exception proves everything. In the exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition. Carl Schmitt

is determined only in the encounter with the enemy and they are valued only insofar as they allow for success in the resulting war.

Who one's political 'friends' are is determined only in the encounter with the enemy, and they are valued only insofar as they allow for success in the resulting war. As Martin Jay puts it, 'the hated other [is] needed to create the solidarity of the homogeneous self.'(n5)(Norris 1998: .pdf)THE IDENTIFICATION OF FRIEND/ENEMY AS (1) EXISTENTIAL DECISION NOT ANTICIPATED, AND EVEN PRIOR TO THE LAW -IT SEPARATES OUT THE AUTONOMY OF THE POLITICAL The identification of friend and enemy is an existential decision which cannot be anticipated by law. Moreover, the political is not simply distinct from the legal but prior to it in that no system of norms can be developed or applied without a moment of decision that exceeds the regulation of those norms. (Norris 1998: .pdf) (Norris 1998: .pdf)FRIEND/ENEMY DEFINES A FORM OF LIFE IN WHICH GROUP IDENTITY IS VALUED ABOVE PHYSICAL EXISTENCE -His account of political authority, in particular, rests on an almost Hegelian understanding of the individual's relation to the community and one's own mortality. The friend/enemy criterion defines a particular form of life, one in which group identity is valued above physical existence.(n7) (Norris 1998: .pdf)SCHMITT IS CONCERNED WITH THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF 'ONE'S OWN WAY OF LIFE' As Heinrich Meier notes, Schmitt's imagination reacts to an attack from without... it does not pursue aggressive action of its own.(n9) Indeed, Schmitt himself at one point defines the existential quality of war in precisely defensive terms: 'If physical destruction of human life is not motivated by an existential threat to one's own way of life, then it cannot be justified.'(n10) (Norris 1998: .pdf)THE THREAT OF PHYSICAL DEATH: POLITICAL ACTIONS AND MOTIVES CAN BE REDUCED TO 'FRIENDS AND ENEMIES' -THE FRIEND/ENEMY DESTINATION RECEIVES ITS REAL MEANING IN THE POSSIBILITY OF PHYSICAL KILLING That all said, interpretations of Schmitt that center on his alleged 'occasional' belligerence remain plausible, because of the stress he places on the threat of physical death implicit in the encounter with the enemy. It is this, he argues, that establishes the existential independence of the political: 'The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy'... and, 'The friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing.'(n12) (Norris 1998: .pdf)THE ENEMY IS NOT SOMEONE HATED -HE IS SOLEY THE PUBLIC ENEMY'The enemy,' Schmitt writes, 'is not merely any competitor or just any partner of a conflict in general. He is also not the private adversary whom one hates. An enemy exist only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy . . . .'(n15) (Norris 1998: .pdf)FRIEND AND ENEMY HAVE (1) FORMAL (2) TECHNICAL MEANINGS -PUBLIC FRIEND VS. PRIVATE FRIENDAs one of the criteria of the political, 'friend,' like 'enemy,' has a formal, almost technical meaning. Just as Schmitt argues that the public enemy is conceptually distinct from the private enemy, whom one hates, so is his public friend distinct from the private friend, whom one loves. (Norris 1998: .pdf)FRIENDSHIP -IN STARK CONTRAST TO ARISTOTELIAN AND POPULAR CONCEPTS OF FRIENDSHIP, IT IS NOT EVEN NECESSARY THAT THEY KNOW ONE ANOTHER -ONLY THAT THEY SHARE A 'WAY OF LIFE' Indeed, in stark contrast to both the Aristotelian and the popular concepts of friendship, it is not necessary that those people who share a relation of political friendship even know one another. What is essential is that there be a shared commitment to their way of life. As Schmitt makes clear, that form of life might be defined in any number of ways: 'All concepts, including the concept of mind, are pluralistic and can only be understood in terms of concrete political existence. Just as every nation has its own concept of nation and fin

is a useful ideological instrument of imperialist expansion. To invoke and monopolize the term is to deny the enemy the quality of being human and makes him an outlaw of humanity, opening the door for the most extreme inhumanity.

The concept of humanity is an especially useful ideological instrument of imperialist expansion, and in its ethical-humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle of economic imperialism. Here one is reminded of a somewhat modified expression of Proudhon's: whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat. To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a term probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity... and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity. Carl Schmitt

's essence is negotiation, a cautious half measure, in the hope that the definitive dispute, the decisive bloody battle, can be transformed into a parliamentary debate and permit the decision to be suspended forever in an everlasting discussion.

The essence of liberalism is negotiation, a cautious half measure, in the hope that the definitive dispute, the decisive bloody battle, can be transformed into a parliamentary debate and permit the decision to be suspended forever in an everlasting discussion. Carl Schmitt

is entirely a matter of conflict with the enemy. The relation with the friend is only a pretext: For this conflict.

What is distinctively political, then, is entirely a matter of the conflict with the enemy... the relation with the friend is only a pretext: for this conflict. If the final step of this interpretation were correctly taken, in view of Schmitt's claim that the political has an existential priority over all other forms of association, Wolin would be quite right to conclude that Schmitt is committed to the view that 'all the energies of modern life stand in the service of war.'(n24) How then can Schmitt assure his readers that 'War is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics''(n25) (Norris 1998: .pdf)

is that activity made necessary by a distinction between friends and enemies, with the latter being defined as those who you are ready to enter into existential conflict with.

is not the form of law but lies behind law as an excess which makes possible particular authorities of the law.

In Schmitt's view, sovereignty does not have the form of law... it lies behind, and makes possible the authority of the law. The specificity of the legal form lies not in content or style but in a certain excess, a surplus content that precisely is the trace of a decision: 'That constitutive, specific element of a decision is, from the perspective of the content of the underlying norm, new and alien. Looked at normatively, the decision emanates from nothingness' (33).' (blom hansen)

is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics' -but it is where it appears.

Carl SchmittThinkers

Carl Schmitt