compositionality

concept - object

Frege-Geach problem

language

mathematics

number

reference

nationality

German

occupation / innovator as

mathematician

philosopher

analytic philosopher

logician

innovator in the field of

analytic ordinary language philosophy

analytic philosophy

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is, by its nature, a system, a competence which presupposes a tacit grasp of certain general principles that are never reducible to a mere tally of local utterances.

Whereas Wittgenstein had imagined an indefinite multiplicity of language-games, incommensurable with each other, so paving the way for the particularist doctrine that the signification of sentences could only lie in their heterogeneous usages, Frege understood that language is by its nature a system, competence in which presupposes a tacit grasp of certain general principles that are never reducible to a mere tally of local utterances. At the same time, Frege's philosophy, for all its emphasis on meaning, was not only systematic, but critical. For it retained a stringent concern with truth, where the laxity of Wittgenstein's eventual pragmatics—his notion that all language-games can find their warrant in culturally variable 'forms of life', as apprehended by Spengler—was inevitably to afford a franchise for intellectual relativism. Initially close to Wittgenstein's legacy, Dummett came through his prolonged work on Frege to a reaffirmation of the central importance of the assertoric dimension of language—the specificity and necessity of its claims to accurate report of the world—as against the performative functions so favoured by Austin, for whom there could be no critique of current usages. Wittgenstein's basic programme thus had to be rejected: 'philosophy cannot be content to leave everything as it is,' for 'linguistic practice is not immune to, and may well stand in need of, revision.'

is a field involving objects that are neither physical nor mental.

Frege showed that mathematical objects are neither physical nor mental. He labeled them 'abstract objects.' What did he tell us about abstract objects' Only this: They're neither physical nor mental.

Gottlieb Frege

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Gottlieb Frege