absolute

affect

affective sensations

analysis

approximate determinism

certitude

choice

concept

conscience

consciousness

creative evolution

definition

duration

elan vital

evolution

feeling

form

free will

habitual memory

humor

idea

instinct

intellect

intelligence

intelligent design

intuition

inversion of the real

joke

laughter

life

lived time

living

material unconscious

materialism

matter

memory

memory of imagination

mental state

modernity

music

mysticism

nascent action

organic causality

perception

philosophy

possible - real

pure memory

pure perception

pure recollection

qualitative progress

reality

religion

representation

sex appeal

space and time

spatialization of time

spatialized space

special relativity

thought

time

transindividuality

universe

virtual - actual

zone of indeterminacy

nationality

French

occupation / innovator as

philosopher

innovator in the field of

professor

sociologist

Judaism

scientific organization

American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Lincean Academy

metaphysics

Academy of Sciences of Turin

philosophy of language

epistemology

Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques

philosophy of mathematics

seat 7 of the Académie française

Académie Française

Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences

Irrationalism

continental philosopher

Time and Free Will

Matter and Memory

is not separate from the world of experience. It runs through it.

For Bergson, the absolute is not separate from the world of experience... it runs through it. Kant's critical project was to delimit the domain of reason, to separate what can be known from what cannot-- the unknowable absolute.

is the potential for memory that supports the body in its unconsciously remembered activities.

for bergson, affect is the potential for memory that supports the body in its unconsciously remembered activities

is the dividing of things according to perspectives taken.

the dividing of things according to perspectives taken'

is only achievable in immanence. The ultimate content of this certitude is incommunicable.

For both philosophers it turns out that ultimate certitude can be achieved onty in immanence and that the ultimate content of this certitude is incommunicable. (kolakowski 'husserl and the search for certitude: 72)

is that part of human knowledge representing 'cinematographic thinking' meaning, like a film reel, a concept is a little snapshot of events, a partial image which, once strung together in succession, make things gradually emerge as intelligible.

For Bergson, concepts can only capture a subset of human knowledge because they represent 'cinematographic thinking', that is, snapshots of events and

 fails to get to a thing insofar as it imprisons and denies a thing or concept the respect due to life, which allows a thing to grow, expand through imperceptible metamorphosis. It practical, intimate acquaintance, such as springs from a long companionship.

Our excuse for attacking the problem in our turn must lie in the fact that we shall not aim at imprisoning the comic spirit within a definition. We regard it, above all, as a living thing. However trivial it may be, we shall treat it with the respect due to life. We shall confine ourselves to watching it grow and expand. Passing by imperceptible gradations from one form to another, it will be seen to achieve the strangest metamorphoses. We shall disdain nothing we have seen. Maybe we may gain from this prolonged contact, for the matter of that, something more flexible than an abstract definition,-- a practical, intimate acquaintance, such as springs from a long companionship. (Bergson: Laughter)

is the actualization of 'qualitative' rather than a 'quantitative' multiplicity.

Deleuze finds that the problem of continuity is better posed by Bergson, when he says that a duration is the actualization of 'qualitative' rather than a 'quantitative' multiplicity. To continue a multiplicity is to move into a zone that is not logically predetermined, but rather 'invents by differentiating.'21 (Rajchman 2000 : 59)

is a substratum with no reality... it is merely a symbol intended to unceasingly recall to our consciousness the artificial character of the process by which the attention places clean-cut states side by side, where actually there is a continuity which unfolds.

(4) psychic states. As a matter of fact, this substratum has no reality... it is merely a symbol intended to recall unceasingly to our consciousness the artificial character of the process by which the attention places clean-cut states side by side, where actually there is a continuity which unfolds. (bergson 'creative evoltuion' 10)

is always a case of a virtuality in the process of being actualized, a simplicity in the process of differentiating, a totality in the process of dividing proceeding 'by dissociation and division,' by 'dichotomy,' is the essence of life.

It is always a case of a virtuality in the process of being actualized, a simplicity in the process of differentiating, a totality in the process of dividing Proceeding 'by dissociation and division,' by 'dichotomy,' is the essence of life' (Deleuze in Hardt Apprentice15-16).

is a persistence of the past in the present, a duration which is, as it were, a hyphen, a connecting link.

Evolution implies a real persistence of the past in the present, a duration which is, as it were, a hyphen, a connecting link. In other words, to know a living being or natural system is to get at the very interval of duration, (bergson 'creative evolution' 24)

is creative precisely because it is characterized by an unending conflict between the cessation of the flow of becoming-in the creation of forms such as organisms and species-and the tendency of the flow of becoming to break out of any fixed or stable determination.

Deleuze, as we shall see, stresses that for Bergson evolution is not accidental but creative precisely because it proceeds via indetermination. For Bergson matter never goes 'to the end', with the result that the isolation of life 'is never complete' (this is one of the reasons why Bergson is such an interesting and co1nplex finalist). Whatever remains excessive to an isolable system is untouched by science since it regards the existence of this excess as negligible to its own. monitoring of a system's activities. But it is this excess which is important to Bergson: individuality is a characteristic property of life even though it is difficult to determine precisely its boundaries and borders.

is not accidental but creative precisely because it proceeds via indetermination.

What is real is the continual change of form: form is only a snapshot view of a transition' (Bergson)

is the mechanical encrusted on the living. That is, humor is not a release of tension but a stimulating rebuke to every inelasticity of character, thought, action.

Bergson's basic argument is that laughter is elicited by a percep tion of the mechanical encrusted on the living, of the 'mechanization of life . '9 Where life is defined essentially by its 'organic elasticity, ' as a ceaselessly changing, irreversible process of pure time and perpetual novelty, the mechanical is defined by its machinelike intractability, manifest in three different operations: repetition, inversion, and the reciprocal interference of series. These operations are illustrated by children's toys, automata, such as Jacks-in-the-box... puppets... a game of ninepins in which the ball rolls forward, upsetting the pins, and backward, restoring the pins to their upright position. Laughter is thought to serve a social function, not, as in Freud, by providing a potentially healing respite from the expenditure of energy, but rather by issuing a rebuke to every inelasticity of character, thought, and action. Laughter thus acts to restore us to social life and its constant demands for our alert attention and complete presence of mind. (copjec 'read my desire')

is the faculty of making artificial objects, especially tools to make tools.

Intelligence is the faculty of making artificial objects, especially tools to make tools. Henri Bergson

is both a knowledge faculty that opposes intelligence and a philosophical method constituted by rational procedures which provides and enriches it.

Our purpose is to show that intuition, according to Bergson's thought, is both a knowledge faculty that opposes intelligence and a philosophical method constituted by rational procedures which provides and enriches it. In this way, both aspects of intuition are intimately connect and indispensable to the understanding of each other.

is a means of imposing cultural morality in that they enforce the rules of society by ridiculing those members of society who challenge those rules.

For Henri Bergson, jokes are a means of imposing cultural morality in that they enforce the rules of society by ridiculing those members of society who challenge those rules: '. . . It is the business of laughter to repress any separatist tendency.

Our laughter is always the laughter of a group.

is elicited by a perception of something mechanical encrusted upon the organic elasticity of the living. It is a kind of rebuke to every inelasticity of character, thought, and action. It restores us to social life and its constant demands for our alert attention and complete presence of mind.

Bergson's basic argument is that laughter is elicited by a perception of the mechanical encrusted on the living, of the 'mechanization of life . '9 Where life is defined essentially by its 'organic elasticity, ' as a ceaselessly changing, irreversible process of pure time and perpetual novelty, the mechanical is defined by its machinelike intractability, manifest in three different operations: repetition, inversion, and the reciprocal interference of series. These operations are illustrated by children's toys, automata, such as Jacks-in-the-box... puppets... a game of ninepins in which the ball rolls forward, upsetting the pins, and backward, restoring the pins to their upright position. Laughter is thought to serve a social function, not, as in Freud, by providing a potentially healing respite from the expenditure of energy, but rather by issuing a rebuke to every inelasticity of character, thought, and action. Laughter thus acts to restore us to social life and its constant demands for our alert attention and complete presence of mind. (copjec 'read my desire')

is a current sent through matter, so that there are no things, only actions.

Life itself is a current sent through matter, so that 'there are no things, only actions.' The intellect is not denied: memory acts as mediator betA STween the intellect and the irrational flow of life. In contrast, Nietzsche wrote with an essentially Newtonian view of physics.

Henri Bergson

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