action

aesthetics

affect

beetle in a box

belief

body

builders

certainty

clarity

color

concept

death

description

doubt

duck-rabbit

face

fact

family resemblance

form of life

French (language)

generality

genius

humor

joke

knowledge

language

language game

learning

logic

madness

mathematics

meaning as representation

meaning in use

music

mystical

object

ontology

pain

perspicuous representation

philosopher

philosophy

picture

picture theory of meaning

prayer

present

private language

purpose of life

religion

resting on your laurels

rule

rule following

rule following argument

scepticism

security

Sigmund Freud

simile

Soren Kierkegaard

state of affairs

truth

word

world

nationality

Austrian

occupation / innovator as

university professor

Trinity College

University of Cambridge

innovator in the field of

analytic philosophy

philosophy of language

philosophy of mathematics

philosophy of mind

architectural theoretician

philosopher of language

British

professor

sexual orientation

homosexual

mathematician

epistemologist

logician

aphorist

cause of death

natural causes

World War I

Tractatus Logico-philosophicus

is that which gains its meaning not from 'inner' accompaniments, but from its place within the background of regular practices, techniques and customs of a community. As we are initiated into a communal life-world, we become tuned in to those ways of responding that make up the background of intelligibility embodied in the 'common ways of acting'.

To obey a rule,' he says, 'to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions). . . .To understand a language means to be master of a technique' (PI 199). What comes across here is that action gains its meaning not from 'inner' accompaniments, but from its place within the background of regular practices, techniques and customs of a community. As we are initiated into a communal life-world, we become tuned in to those ways of responding that make up the background of intelligibility embodied in the 'common ways of acting' (Wittgenstein in Guignon 1990:659)

Ethics and aesthetics are one (TLP 6.421).

is (not a term Wittgenstein uses but he poses a question very relevant to affect discourse): 'When I see someone being killed-- is it simply what I see that makes an impression on me or does it come with the hypothesis that someone is being killed here''.

When I see someone being killed-- is it simply what I see that makes an impression on me or does it come with the hypothesis that someone is being killed here' [Wittgenstein 1979:17e]

is that which cannot be doubted. It concerns not metaphysical truths, but the grammatical impossibility of certain sentences. One, for example, cannot say: 'It is raining and I do not believe it'.

When [Wittgenstein] says that it is possible to misinterpret one's own sense impressions but not one's beliefs, he is not referring to the content of an inner experience but rather to the grammatical impossibility of inferring one's belief (or one's pain) introspectively. That is why he says that if there were a verb that meant 'to believe falsely,' it would lack a first-person present indicative. Wittgenstein is not stating a metaphysical truth about belief here, but a grammatical one. . . .'it is raining and I do not believe it' (Veena Das 1998:188).

is actually presupposed in any attempt at doubting.

The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty' (Wittgenstein On Certainty 115)

is, as it were, a tone of voice, one in which one declares how things are.

30. When someone has made sure of something, he says: 'Yes, the calculation is right', but he did not infer that from his condition of certainty. One does not infer how things are from one's own certainty. Certainty is as it were a tone of voice in which one declares how things are, but one does not infer from the tone of voice that one is justified. (wittgenstein On Certainty #30)

is not about propositions but is about a foundational way of acting which underpins our epistemic activity.

So for Wittgenstein, certainty is to be understood as a kind of foundational way of acting, which underpins our epistemic activity.

is that which suggests that logic makes it impossible to experience going wrong.

It must in a certain sense be impossible for us to go wrong in logic. This is already partly expressed by saying: Logic must take care of itself. This is an extremely profound and important insight. [Cf. 5.473.] (Wittgenstein on certainty pg. 2THE GAME OF DOUBTING ITSELF PRESUPPOSES CERTAINTY 'The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty' (Wittgenstein On Certainty 115)So for Wittgenstein, certainty is to be understood as a kind of foundational way of acting, which underpins our epistemic activity.

 could conceivably be differentiated based on luster, such that shiny black and matt black would different color names.

Ludwig Wittgenstein voiced the same idea in his Remarks on Color: 'Mightn't shiny black and matt black have different color names'' (in his black monochromes of the 1960s, the American minimalist Ad Reinhardt used these two as if they were indeed distinct colors.).

is not a mental object, but the topography of a word's uses.

For Wittgenstein, a 'concept' is not an 'intension,' a mental object, but the topography of a word's uses. A Wittgensteinian 'concept' cannot be summed up by specifying a conjunction or cluster of properties... all we can do is survey the variety of our uses of a word, and in this way call attention to some aspect or other of the diversity of these uses.'

is not an event in life: We do not live to experience death. If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present.

Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death. If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present.

is that which must take the place of explanation.

we must do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place' (PI 109)

is that which we must have grounds for just as we do for belief. We do not have grounds to doubt 'I know I have a brain'.

I know that I am a human being.' In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation. At most it might be taken to mean 'I know I have the organs of a human'. (E.g. a brain which, after all, no one has ever yet seen.) But what about such a proposition as 'I know I have a brain'' Can I doubt it' Grounds for doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it. Nevertheless it is imaginable that my skull should turn out empty when it was operated on. (Wittgenstein on certainty.2 #4)

is a visual illusion that shows that the form of the world is not actually in the world at all, but in the ways we think about it.

The form of the world, on this view, is not actually in the world at all, but in the ways we think about it.

is the part of a logical space wherein truth-functionality arises.

For Wittgenstein, a fact is a determinate, logically structured arrangement of elements: a fact is part of logical space, that is, of the space in which truth-functionality arises (TLP 1.13). A picture is a fact in that it is a determinate locical arrangement of elements in a possible state and thereby depicts or represents it... it is for this reason that a picture possesses a truth-functional structure, as we will see below. Logical complexity -that is, being a logically strucured determinate arranagement of elements . . .

is a push against the fixity of meaning. We tend to wrongly think of words as labels that we can apply to things, ideas, mental states, and so on.

The idea of family resemblance is Wittgenstein's answer to the idea of fixity of meaning. We tend to think of words as labels that we can apply to things, ideas, mental states, and so on. This leads to the notion that a word like 'understanding' must have one fixed meaning, which we might identify as some sort of mental state or process. When we use the word 'understanding' in different contexts, we think that both uses of the word share something in common.' (sparknotes)

is similar to a rope where the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.

like a thread 'where the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres'

is the idea that whereas we are inclined to think that there must be something in common to all games, whereas games form a family, the members of which have family likenesses. Some of them have the same nose, others the same eyebrows, and others again the same way of walking ... and these likenesses overlap.

We are inclined to think that there must be something in common to all games, say, and that this common property is the justification for applying the general term ' game ' to the various games ... whereas games form a family, the members of which have family likenesses. Some of them have the same nose, others the same eyebrows, and others again the same way of walking ... and these likenesses overlap.' (pompa 1967:63)

is 'the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language.

Forms of life can be understood as changing and contingent, dependent on culture, context, history, etc... this appeal to forms of life grounds a relativistic reading of Wittgenstein. On the other hand, it is the form of life common to humankind, 'shared human behavior' which is 'the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language' (PI 206). This might be seen as a universalistic turn, recognizing that the use of language is made possible by the human form of life.'

is defined by the fact that it is a form created by and for those who are in possession of language.

Wittgenstein takes language to be the mark of human sociality: Hence human forms of life are defined by the fact that they are forms created by and for those who are in possession of language' (Das 1998:180)

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Authors(0)

Books (0)

Books (0)

Ludwig WittgensteinThinkers

Books (0)

Ludwig Wittgenstein