archaeology of knowledge

is a method of excavating historical materials at a level of the positive unconscious, that is, at the level of knowledge which eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is part of scientific discourse. For example, unknown to themselves, the naturalist, economist, and grammarians employed the same rules to define the objects proper to their own study, to form their concepts, to build their theories.

What I would like to do, however, is to reveal a positive unconscious of knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is part of scientific discourse, instead of disputing its validity and seeking to diminish its scientific nature. What was common to the natural history, the economics, and the grammar of the Classical period was certainly not present to the consciousness of the scientist... or that part of it that was conscious was superficial, limited, and almost fanciful (Adanson, for example, wished to draw up an artificial denomination for plants... Turgot compared coinage with language)...but, unknown to themselves, the naturalist, economist, and grammarians employed the same rules to define the objects proper to their own study, to form their concepts, to build their theories. It is these rules of formation, which were never formulated in their own right, but are to be found only in widely differing theories, concepts, and objects of study, that I have tried to reveal, by isolating, as their specific locus, a level that I have called, somewhat arbitrarily perhaps, archaeological. (Foucaul 1966: x)

is an approach in historical studies grounded in the notion that knowledge does not progress chronologically within disciplines, but rather moves across disciplinary lines. (i.e. The discipline of biology, for example, zigzags through changing theories of representations sweeping up science, economics, linguistics).

What I would like to do, however, is to reveal a positive unconscious of knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is part of scientific discourse, instead of disputing its validity and seeking to diminish its scientific nature. What was common to the natural history, the economics, and the grammar of the Classical period was certainly not present to the consciousness of the scientist... or that part of it that was conscious was superficial, limited, and almost fanciful (Adanson, for example, wished to draw up an artificial denomination for plants... Turgot compared coinage with language)...but, unknown to themselves, the naturalist, economist, and grammarians employed the same rules to define the objects proper to their own study, to form their concepts, to build their theories. It is these rules of formation, which were never formulated in their own right, but are to be found only in widely differing theories, concepts, and objects of study, that I have tried to reveal, by isolating, as their specific locus, a level that I have called, somewhat arbitrarily perhaps, archaeological. (Foucault 1966: x)

archaeology of knowledge, n.All

archaeology of knowledge