continental philosophy

analytic philosophy

is concerned with the overcoming of metaphysics where the 'meta' refers us to something transcendent, like the second realm of ideas, permanently present.

Continental philosophy concerns the overcoming of metaphysics where the 'meta' refers us to something transcendent, like the second realm of ideas, permanently present.' (Lawlor, Leonard p6).

 seeks to challenge our intuitions by the creation of new and (at first) highly counter-intuitive vocabularies whereas analytic philosophy is a philosophical school that sets out to achieve maximal clarity about the content and basis of our intuition.

Metaphilosophical Coda' to his book Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity . There he defines analytic philosophy as 'the effort to attain maximal clarity about the content and basis of our intuitions' (184) a description he says includes Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Habermas while continental philosophy (analytic philosophy's 'essential counterpart') seeks to challenge our intuitions 'by the creation of new and (at first) highly counter-intuitive vocabularies' (190). Here you can see why a doctrine might be evaluated not by its logical rigor, but by its intellectual imaginativeness. He approvingly quotes Deleuze, 'Philosophy is the art of forming, inventing and fabricating concepts,' and claims the mistake made by both analytic and continental philosophers (in the sense he means the terms) is to think what they are doing suffices for philosophical inquiry, when in fact both (and historical critique) are necessary. This last point aside, it helps to know that when Gutting is speaking of continental philosophy he has in mind philosophers like Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze and not philosophers like Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Habermas. (NET)

 typically sees experience as penetrating beyond the veneer of common-sense and science, and regards reason as more a matter of intellectual imagination than deductive rigor whereas analytic philosophy reads experience in terms of common-sense intuitions (often along with their developments and transformations in science) and understands reason in terms of formal logic.

I agree [with Leiter] that there is no fruitful analytic-Continental division in terms of substantive doctrines distinctively characteristic of the two sides. But it seems to me that we can still draw a significant distinction between analytic and Continental philosophy in terms of their conceptions of experience and reason as standards of evaluation. Typically, analytic philosophy reads experience in terms of common-sense intuitions (often along with their developments and transformations in science) and understands reason in terms of formal logic. Continental philosophy, by contrast, typically sees experience as penetrating beyond the veneer of common-sense and science, and regards reason as more a matter of intellectual imagination than deductive rigor. In these terms, Continental philosophy still exist as a significant challenge to the increasing hegemony of analytic thought and, as such, deserved a hearing in this volume.' (net)

 has too often overlooked the fact that man's thinking is organically connected with his conduct.

The Continental schools of philosophy have too often overlooked the fact that man's thinking is organically connected with his conduct. It seems to me to be the chief glory of English and Scottish thinkers to have kept the organic connection in view. (James Philosophy 367-8)

is influenced by key trends of the past century in Germany and France, especially the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger.

By contrast, continental philosophy is influenced by key trends of the past century in Germany and France, especially the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger.

is a domain in which the great philosophers are admired not for making valid arguments, but rather for their stylistic brio and their systematic visions of the universe.

For this reason, continentals are reluctant to reduce their philosophical heroes to a specific list of “arguments,” since they have the instinctive sense that this procedure fails to do justice to the great figures. Indeed, the continentals maintain a permanent temple of great names, all of them much admired by the adherents of this school, whereas analytic philosophy does not seem to mind that it has produced so few thinkers who are likely to survive through the ages (Wittgenstein comes to mind, along with Saul Kripke and two or three other dark horse candidates). The great philosophers are admired by the continentals not for making valid arguments, but rather for their stylistic brio and their systematic visions of the universe.

is of the mind that movement in philosophy consists not of step-by-step progress through professional journals and conference papers (pace analytic philosophy), but rather of massive paradigm shifts unleashed every once in awhile by rare great thinkers.

If analytics see continentals as fuzzy dreamers lost in the history books and unable to make clear arguments, continentals return the favor by seeing the analytics as dry technicians who waste their time with nail-filing arguments over minor, artificial problems. Unlike the analytics, continentals only rarely cite books or articles published in the past few years. Their view is that movement in philosophy consists not of step-by-step progress through professional journals and conference papers, but rather of massive paradigm shifts unleashed every once in awhile by rare great thinkers.

continental philosophy, n.All

continental philosophy