dialectic

G.W.F. Hegel

Valentine's Day

is a three step process involving first a stage whereby concepts are taken as fixed, sharply defined and distinct from one another, then a stage whereby, through reflecting on them, a contradiction emerges, and lastly, a higher concept emerges which resolves the contradiction.

Per Inwood, dialectic involves three steps: (1) one or more concepts are taken as fixed, sharply defined and distinct from one another = stage of understanding... (2) through reflection on them, a contradiction or contradictions emerge = stage of dialectical reason... (3) the result is a higher concept which embraces the earlier ones and resolves their contradiction = stage of speculative reason. Hegel thus inverts Kant's sense of dialectic as a logic of illusion. Geraets et al distinguish a broad use of dialectic, to refer to the entire movement of the self-articulation of thought, from a narrower use, which refers to the self-negations of the understanding.

is the narrow gateway through which error most prefers to worm its way towards truth.

the narrow gateway through which error most prefers to worm its way towards truth.

is all movement and change, both in the world and in our thought about it. It also explains why things, as well as our thoughts, systematically cohere with each other.

Dialectic, on Hegel's view, accounts for all movement and change, both in the world and in our thought about it. It also explains why things, as well as our thoughts, systematically cohere with each other. But the transience of finite things and the elevation (Erhebung) above the finite effected by dialectical thought also has a religious significance for him, and he is inclined to assimilate dialectic in the negative sense to the POWER (Macht) of God. (inwood 1992 : 82)

is at once the preservation and the abolishment of a concept. Their sense is modified such that it renders them nolonger self-contradictory.

This new category unites as Hegel puts it the preceding categories A and B. That is to say, when analyzed the new category is found to contain them both. But it unites them in such a way that they are not only preserved but also abolished (to use Hegel's term of art for this paradoxical-sounding process, they are aufgehoben).12 That is to say, they are preserved or contained in the new category only with their original senses modified. This modification of their senses renders them no longer self-contradictory (and not a source of self (foster 2006 'hegel's dialectic' : 132)

is generally conversation, but for hegel it is not two thinkers, or a thinker and his subject matter, it is the autonomous self-criticism and self-development of the subject-matter, e.g., a for of 'consciousness' or a concept.

For Hegel, dialectic does not involve a dialogue either between two thinkers or between a thinker and his subject-matter. It is conceived as the autonomous self-criticism and self-DEVELOPMENT of the SUBJECT-MATTER, of, e.g., a form of CONSCIOUSNESS or a concept. (inwood 1992 81)

is just that inveterate, infuriating perversity whereby a commonsense empiricist view of reality is repudiated and undermined.

Or perhaps we might rather say : this is not a paradox, this is perversity. And indeed, the dialectic is just that inveterate, infuriating perversity whereby a commonsense empiricist view of reality is repudiated and undermined. But it is undermined together with its own accompanying interpretations of that reality, which look so much more astute and ingenious than the commonsense empiricist reality itself, until we understand that the interpretations are themselves also part of precisely that 'first impression'. (Jameson 2006 : pdf. )

is not a method, but the intrinsic structure and development of the subject-matter itself.

On this account, dialectic is not a method, in the sense of a procedure that the thinker applies to his subject-matter, but the intrinsic structure and development of the subject-matter itself. (inwood 1992 : 82)

is not a paradox but a perversity whereby a commonsense empiricist view of reality is repudiated and undermined, until we understand that the interpretations are in fact part of the 'first impression'.

dialectic, n.All

dialectic