foreign policy

expertise

is, for Japanese, a translation of economic power into political influence in what might be called 'leadership by stealth'.

Reinhard Drifte outlines Japan's pursuit of political objectives in addition to economic ones, arguing Japan has been translating economic power into political influence, which he calls 'leadership by stealth' (Drifte 1998).

Japan

is, for Japanese, minimalist, or a kind of 'coping', meaning it proceeds by opportunistically assessing the international situation carefully, methodically weighing and sorting out each alternative, waiting for the dust to settle on contentious issues, achieving domestic consensus and adapting to the existing situation with the fewest risks.

Like Calder, Michael Blaker denies the importance of strategic considerations in Japanese foreign policy when he describes this policy as minimalist or coping (he actually argues that Japan is trying to cope but unsuccessfully) (Blaker 1993: 1-42). By 'coping' he means that Japan is carefully assessing the international situation, methodically weighing and sorting out each alternative, waiting for the dust to settle on contentious issues, achieving domestic consensus and adapting to the existing situation with the fewest risks. In short, he sees Japanese foreign policy as being highly opportunistic. He is right in that Japan's diplomacy was minimalist until recently, particularly in the security area. It seems also true that Japan's diplomacy was not (perhaps still is not) very sophisticated tactically, which can be attributed to its deferring to the US in many political and security issues, thus sometimes failing to achieve sufficient objectives or missing opportunities to enhance national interests in some individual cases, as illustrated by his two case studies on Japan's policies towards the third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference in the 1970s and the GulfWar in the early 1990s. However, many would disagree that this tactical inability of Japan's diplomacy suggests a lack of strategy in Japanese foreign policy as a whole.

is, for Japanese, neither active nor reactive but rather represents a quiet, low-profile, gradual style that allows Japanese to effectively pursue its policy agendas.

One reason for the negative concept of Japanese foreign policy is that most existing literature on this topic has neglected or underestimated an important characteristic of Japanese foreign policy, namely Japan's quiet and gradual style of pursuing its policy agendas. This book argues that Japan has carried out its policies in a different style from what the dominant international relations literature usually expects: Japan has preferred to keep a low profile while quietly and incrementally carrying out its policies. Indeed, this style of Japanese foreign policy has been quite effective in realising policy goals, given the domestic, regional and international constraints. However, only a small number of studies have noted this important characteristic of Japanese foreign policy.2 The book considers that neglecting, or underestimating, this has greatly contributed to misunderstandings over Japanese foreign policy.

is, for Japanese, not passive, but rather a purposeful, shrewd, skillful, and single-minded interest in securing economic and political interests (inducing economic and military security, rapid modernization, great power status, and world recognition of its accomplishments).

William Nester recognises the more aggressive nature of Japanese foreign economic policy. He is convinced that Japan is skillfully, successfully and single-mindedly securing its economic and political interests, and notes four Japanese foreign policy goals, namely economic and military security, rapid modernisation, acquiring great power status and world recognition of its accomplishments. These were pursued through state-led industrialization and imperialism before the war and neo-mercantilism after the war (Nester 1990: 7199). To him, Japanese foreign policy, particularly foreign economic policy, has been purposeful and shrewd, not passive.

is, for Japanese, not so much passive as strategically responsive. External stimuli may provide the initial push, but Japanese then incorporates the stimuli into its own policy objectives and fashions a policy that may or may not respond directly to the intent or wishes of that stimuli.

Dennis Yasutomo also opposes the idea that the Japanese government is paralysed by policy immobilism and only reacts to external pressures purposelessly, neglecting its national interest (Yasutomo 1995). He accepts that Japanese policy is in a sense as reactive as othe1 governments are, and 'so much of Japan's foreign policy is tailored to responding, either in anticipation or after-the-fact, to the expectations, hopes, and fears of foreign actors, both nation-state and non-nation-state' (Yasutomo 1995: 188). However, he argues that his case studies about Japan's multilateral bank policies and aid policies do not show that Japan is like a billiard ball, bouncing off the movement of others, and that Japan's behaviour reveals a Japanese agenda, often pursued against the wishes of others. In short, what he stresses is that external stimuli provide the initial push, but 'Japan then incorporates the stimuli into its own policy objectives and fashions a policy that may or may not respond directly to the intent or wishes of that stimuli' (Yasutomo 1995: 188).

is, for Japanese, purposeful and skillful. Japan uses overseas development assistance (oda) policy to contribute to a rapid rise in Japanese's standing in East Asia as a strategy to embrace the region in a complex web of personal, governmental, and cooperate ties all united under the ubiquitous banner of economic cooperation.

Arase argues that the institutional structure of Japan's overseas development assistance (ODA) policy reflects the role of the postwar Japanese state in guiding the private sector towards national developmental goals, and, while the private sector is not passive and has greatly benefited from the government's ODA policy, ' it is the state bureaucracy that holds the balance of power' (Arase 1995: 247). Thus, according to them, Japanese foreign policy, specifically foreign economic policy, is very purposeful and skillful. The increased inflow of Japanese private and public capital has had a great effect on the region's economy, which naturally has raised Japan's profile in East Asia and has created the conditions that have led to a gradual, albeit still limited, acceptance of Japan's larger role in the region. Hatch and Yamamura put it as follows: '[the rapid rise in Japan's standing in East Asia] is the product of a deliberate, largely successful strategy to embrace the region in a complex web of personal, governmental, and cooperate ties all united under the ubiquitous banner of keizai kyoryoku, or economic cooperation' (Hatch and Yamamura 1996: 115).

is, for Japan, such that it does not make the rules in the world community, but simply tries to adapt to them and, if possible, excel at playing the game. When faced with difficulty, however, Japanese tends simply to ignore or reject those rules altogether.

Japan has seldom tried to present itself as a rule-maker in the world community. The rules were already there. Japan simply tried to adapt to them and, if possible, excel at playing the game. When faced with difficulty, however, it tended simply to ignore or reject those rules altogether. (Yoichi Funabashi 1991 / 1992: 60)

is, for Japan, such that it is not necessary for Japanese to act positively, because it can reap considerable benefits from the existing international orders.

Takakazu Kuriyama, a former Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, accepts this, and argues that Japan did not have to act positively because Japan could reap considerable benefits from the existing international orders (Kuriyama 1991: 113).

foreign policy, n.All

foreign policy