phenomenon

is an appearance in so far as phenomena are thought as objects according to the unity of the categories.

In this view the 'laws of phenomena' comprise 'the laws both of experience and generally of all sensitive cognition' (5). These distinction are carried over into CPR, with phenomena distinguished from noumena in terms of sensible and intelligible worlds (A 249) and in terms of sensible and intelligible objects (B 306). Similarly, (317) phenomena are distinguished from appearances in so far as they combine the laws of sensible and intellectual cognition or, to use the language of CPR, they are 'Appearances, so far as they are thought as objects according to the unity of the categories' (A 248). (318)

is an entity considered along the lines of how we might consider a shirt showered in multi-colored light. It becomes entirely different depending on the particular kind of access we have to it at any given moment. As such, rather than trying to pin down what color the shirt 'really' is, we join the bull in simply taking it fort what it is, charge it at the moment it becomes bright red.

a phenomenon is an entity considered along the lines of how we might consider a shirt showered in multi-colored light. it becomes entirely different depending on the particular kind of access we have to it at any given moment. as such, rather than trying to pin down what color the shirt 'really' is, we simply take it as it is, much like the bull who, for example would charge it at the moment it becomes bright red (ryan sayre).

is an entity in an aspect other than its 'thinginess'. It is an ontological way of looking and makes the intractable materialism idealism problem disappear.

Therefore, the conceptual choice people have faced in the past is either to deny the world's phenomenological existence, or to describe it in metaphysical terms (effectively mystifying it). In Heidegger's opinion, both theses views are mistaken, precisely because they are grounded in the flawed paradigm of traditional ontology, which privileges an objective view of the world. So, it is perhaps not surprising that philosophers working in this tradition have developed no concepts, nor any arguments to adequately describe the world as a phenomenon. Consequently, despite a plethora of theories that attempt to account for the phenomenon known as the world, none can account for the extra surplus quality that the world seemingly has. The aim of Heidegger's analysis is to show how these problem disappear, when the world is looked at ontologically. (munday)

is derived from the greek 'to show itself' or 'to bring something to light'. It designates those things that show themselves as themselves.

The ancient Greek expression phenomenon is derived from the verb 'to show itself'. To show itself, in ancient Greek, also connoted 'bringing something to the light'. In this sense, phenomenon signifies, 'that which shows itself in itself.' (munday)

is grounded in the idea that entities show themselves in many ways, depending on the kind of access we have to them. Indeed it is even possible for an entity to show itself as something it is not.

This signification of phenomenon alludes to the fact that an entity can show itself for itself in many ways, depending on the kind of access we have to it. Indeed it is even possible for an entity to show itself as something it is not. The use of the term 'phenomena' is restricted in Heidegger's usage to designate only those things that show themselves for themselves. (munday)

is a part of Being which is never truly isolate from Being taken as a whole, and is in fact a reflection of that whole.

i. Each part of Being (which takes the form of a particular phenomenon) is never truly isolate from Being taken as a whole. ii. Each part of being is itself a reflection of that whole. (munday)

is that which already shows itself in appearance, as prior to the conception of phenomena.

Heidegger defines phenomena as 'that which already shows itself in appearance, as prior to the conception of phenomena,'. (munday)

is that which announces itself. It is that of which the reality precisely is the appearance.

At all events, phenomenology is the study of phenomena not of the facts. And by a phenomenon we are to understand 'that which announces itself', that of which the reality precisely is the appearance. And this 'announcement of itself' is not that of anything else . . . the being of the existent is not a thing 'behind which' there is still something else which 'does not yet appear'. (sartre 'basic writings' : 67)

phenomenon, n.All

phenomenon