spatiality

is a phenomenon rather than being some kind of mystical thing. A room, for example, is considered as a piece of equipment.

Contrary to this, Heidegger argues space is discoverable as a phenomenon. For instance, if we consider a room as a piece of equipment (to paraphrase Le Corbusier a machine for living in) We can, at the same time, think of it also as a collection of other pieces of equipment that comes together to constitute a room. Of course a room is not normally defined in terms of its equipmentality, but rather as something conceived of in terms of its spatiality. Thus, we tend to think of a room rather passively as something as the space 'between four walls. Hence, we easily fall into the trap of considering the room philosophically in terms of the abstract notion of space, and not in terms of the more everyday notion as a piece of equipment (for Being in). And in doing so, we also mystify its existence into something that is not phenomenological (ref Kant). (munday)

is a condition of possibility of space. It is inseparable from our capacity to sense, touch and see within the context of a specific bodily orientation

From the perspective of phenomenology space is not simply the extension of three dimensions such as it can measured by mathematics. Phenomenology is not interested in traditional debates relating to the question of whether space is a substantive thing in itself or simply a relation between things (theories known as substantivalism and relationalism respectively). Rather phenomenology thinks space as that which is first and foremost experienced. It thinks of space as spatiality, that is to say, as a spatial perception or awareness which is inseparable from the manner in which our bodies are positioned. Spatiality is inseparable from our capacity to sense, touch and see within the context of a specific bodily orientation.

is that on whose basis, and only on whose basis, we can come to some abstract or theoretical understanding of space.

It is only on the basis of this prior experience of spatiality, the argument runs, that we can come to some abstract or theoretical understanding of space. The theoretical understanding of space as the extension of three dimensions (or indeed any other theoretical or scientific understanding of space) would not be possible if we did not first encounter space as situated and lived spatiality.

is not about coordinates, but about recognizing and responding to the fact that, say, a stop sign, is in the right place or wrong place with respect to other things in the environment.

We do not usually locate stop signs, gas stations, or traffic cones along pure axes of latitude and longitude measured from satellites, but simply notice right away if they are in the right place or wrong place with respect to other things in the environment.

is not defined by, say, how many kilometers my house is from the capital. Instead, its space is defined by its “sunny side,” “shady side,” and other terms that relate to my use of it in my life.

We should also speak briefly about the spatiality of equipment. This has nothing to do with its presence-at-hand in a distinct geometric location. The space of equipment is above all a place—a place in which it has a specific relation to all other equipment. The spatiality of my house is not defined by how many kilometers it is from the capital. Instead, its space is defined by its “sunny side,” “shady side,” and other terms that relate to my use of it in my life.

Before leaving this issue, it is worth noting briefly that space reappears later in Being and Time (70: 418–21), where Heidegger argues that existential space is derived from temporality. This makes sense within Heidegger's overall project, because, as we shall see, the deep structure of totalities of involvements (and thus of equipmental space) is finally understood in terms of temporality.

is only possible in the physical, Cartesian manner because to be in the world is to have a phenomenological, non-physical notion of space as one of its existential characteristics.

For Heidegger, physical, Cartesian space is possible as something meaningful for Dasein only because Dasein has de-severance as one of its existential characteristics. Given the intertwining of de-severance and equipmental space, this licenses the radical view (one that is consistent with Heidegger's prior treatment of Cartesianism) that physical, Cartesian space (as something that we can find intelligible) presupposes equipmental space; the former is the present-at-hand phenomenon that is revealed if we strip away the worldhood from the latter.

is not a reference to a physical Cartesian space, rather an entity is 'near by' if it is readily available for some such activity, and 'far away' if it is not, whatever physical distances may be involved.

spatiality, n.All

spatiality