subject - object

existence

identity

reincarnation

is a distinction which assumes a project and a base, an oppositeness: The thing which touches us and is in touch with us if we achieve our humanity, need not be represented by us constantly and specifically. But even so it is concentrated, gathered toward us beforehand.

Whenever we speak of subject and object, there is in our thoughts a project and a base, an oppositeness-there is always contact in the widest sense. It is possible that the thing which touches us and is in touch with us if we achieve our humanity, need not be represented by us constantly and specifically. But even so it is concentrated, gathered toward us beforehand. In a certain manner, though not exclusively, we ourselves are that gathering. (Heidegger 'what is thinking :144)

is a function of conceptualization (in that the objectivity of a sensation occurs by way of the concept), and is not a fundamental condition of our understanding (as thinkers like schopenhauer would later have it.).

For Schopenhauer, the characterization of the world into subject and object is basic to our perception of the world. The subject/object duality is the 'universal condition of all that appears' [1... p.5]. Thus, for Schopenhauer, when we perceive an object, it is immediately an object set against the subject... whereas, in our Kantian interpretation, the objectivity of the sensation is not immediate, but only occurs through the concept. So, for Kant, objectivity, and hence subjectivity, is a function of conceptualization, and is not a fundamental condition of our understanding, as Schopenhauer has it.

is a kind of epistemological presupposition of a background of everyday practices into which we are socialized but which we do not represent in our minds.

Heidegger shows that this subject/object epistemology presupposes a background of everyday practices intowhich we are socialized but that we do not represent in our minds. Since he calls this more fundamental way of making sense of things our understanding of being, he claims that he is doing ontology, that is, asking about the nature of this understanding of being that we do not know that is not a representation in the mind corresponding to the world-but

is governed by a difference similar to the difference between the two corresponding verbs: To subject (submit) oneself and to object (protest, oppose, make an obstacle).

The difference between subject and object can also be rendered as the difference between the two corresponding verbs, to subject (submit) oneself and to object (protest, oppose, make an obstacle). The subject's elementary, founding, gesture is to subject itself voluntarily, of course: as both Wagner and Nietzsche, the two great opponents, were well aware of, the highest act of freedom is the display of amor fati, the act of freely assuming what is otherwise necessary. If, then, the subject's activity is, at its most fundamental, the activity of submitting oneself to the inevitable, the fundamental mode of object's passivity, of its passive presence, is that which moves, annoys, disturbs, traumatizes us (subjects): the object is at its most radical that which objects, that which disturbs the smooth run of things.'

is a relationship where, on the one hand, the subject is paradoxically that which passively submits itself to the inevitable, the necessary. On the other hand, the fundamental mode of an object is paradoxically that which moves, annoys, disturbs, traumatizes us (subjects): The object is at its most radical that which objects, that which disturbs the smooth run of things.

The subject's elementary, founding, gesture is to subject itself voluntarily, of course: as both Wagner and Nietzsche, the two great opponents, were well aware of, the highest act of freedom is the display of amor fati, the act of freely assuming what is otherwise necessary. If, then, the subject's activity is, at its most fundamental, the activity of submitting oneself to the inevitable, the fundamental mode of object's passivity, of its passive presence, is that which moves, annoys, disturbs, traumatizes us (subjects): the object is at its most radical that which objects, that which disturbs the smooth run of things.'

is a relationship of co-constitution. When you stare into an abyss for a long time, the abyss also stares into you.

When you stare into an abyss for a long time, the abyss also stares into you.

is the universal condition of all that appears. It is basic to our perception of the world. To perceive is not just to perceive an object, but to immediately perceive an object set against the subject.

is a (false) division brought about in post-enlightenment thought whereby things-in-themselves are incorrectly imagined to be detached from the other objects to which they are in fact linked in dynamic associations, or networks.

For Latour, post-Enlightenment thought is condemned to divide the world into passive objects and active subjects. From within this (false) division, things-in-themselves are incorrectly imagined to be detached from the other objects to which they are in fact linked in the dynamic associations he terms networks (We Have Never117-119). (To emphasize their status as always-already linked, Latour refers in his own discourse not to 'objects' but to 'subject-objects.'). For Latour, a network is a never-stable set of such relations, comprising human and nonhuman actors alike... linked together, these chains or webs of interaction among multiple constituents become 'quasi-objects' in themselves. More dynamic than a Bourdieuvian field, less total than a Marxist or Foucauldian system, such mobile webs are knowable to us, Latour says, only by virtue of their 'tracers': the 'subtle pathways' of connection that are materialized in, for example, correspondence, institutional documents, or textual citations like Corelli's mock-dedication (118).[3]'

subject object, n.All

subject object