formal indication

is a method of getting to the heart of some matter by means of suggestions, hints, or allusions (what heidegger calls 'non-committal reference').

In a certain sense, the whole of Heidegger's career amounts to nothing but variations on this same theme. For Heidegger, philosophy is a way of making things present without making them present. It does this by means of suggestions, hints, or allusions to the being of things that lies deeper than their presence to our consciousness. (Harman 2011: ')

is a kind of knowledge that hints at some deeper reality of some thing, say a cactus, without ever claiming to exhaust it. It does this by means of suggestions, hints, or allusions to the being of things that lies deeper than their presence to our consciousness.

Instead of listing all the adjectives that describe a cactus, or informing us of the obvious fact that the cactus 'is,' formal indication is a kind of knowledge that hints at some deeper reality of the cactus without ever claiming to exhaust it. In a certain sense, the whole of Heidegger's career amounts to nothing but variations on this same theme. For Heidegger, philosophy is a way of making things present without making them present. It does this by means of suggestions, hints, or allusions to the being of things that lies deeper than their presence to our consciousness.

is the idea not of capturing the essence of a thing and explaining it with perfect theoretical clarity. Rather it concerns alluding to a phenomenon in our lives and encouraging us to live in such a way that we pay closer attention to it.

Formally indicative' concepts do not capture the essence of a thing and explain it with perfect theoretical clarity... they allude to a phenomenon in our lives and encourage us to live in such a way that we pay closer attention to it' (Polt 1999:17-18)

is the idea that philosophy is a way of making things present without making them present.

is the hidden meaning of phenomenology; it is how we can talk about facticity rather than sitting in silence.

But if talking about something always means to distort or kill it, how is philosophy possible? After all, we have to say something about any subject, unless we wish to sit in silence. According to Heidegger, the proper way to describe anything in its factical reality is through what he calls “formal indication.” Although Husserl never uses this concept, Heidegger boldly calls it the hidden meaning of phenomenology.

is the name for a new kind of theorizing that points to the facticity of life without reducing it to a set of surface qualities.

For Husserl, there are two ways to theorize about phenomena: “generalization” and “formalization.” The difference between them is easy to explain. Generalization is the kind of theorizing that describes the properties of things, and it always moves step by step in a series of levels. For example, I might say that this cactus is green, this green is a color, this color is a sensory phenomenon, and this sensory phenomenon is a reality. In short, we are dealing here with what traditional philosophy called the “essence” of a thing. Formalization is different. It does not need to move step by step, but can be done at any level of the process. For instance, I can say that this cactus is, but just as easily say that this green is or this color is. Here, we are dealing with what traditional philosophy called the “existence” of a thing. Not surprisingly, Heidegger rejects both generalization and formalization as models of theoretical awareness, since both of them reduce things to their external properties rather than grasping them in their deeper factical reality. “Formal indication” is Heidegger’s name for the new kind of theorizing that somehow points to the facticity of life without reducing it to a set of surface qualities.

is a kind of thinking that does not represent things as objects viewed from the outside, but points toward their mysterious inwardness as unique events.

Heidegger says that we can only see this by stepping away from the kind of thinking that represents things as objects, and toward the kind that he calls “commemorative thinking” or “meditative thinking.” These bulky-sounding terms simply refer to a kind of thinking that does not represent things as objects viewed from the outside, but points toward their mysterious inwardness as unique events. In the early lecture courses, he had called this process “formal indication,” but now gives it a more poetic title.

is the best method for philosophy; not to convert everything into the presence-at-hand, but to hint or point toward the depths of the world, and doing this by projecting a world.

In this context, Heidegger reminds us of his early favorite term, formal indication. What philosophy should really be trying to do is hint or point toward the depths of the world, since all clear and explicit statements have the tendency to convert everything into presence-at-hand, and this is what must be avoided. Dasein is world-forming because, unlike animals, it projects a world.

formal indication, n.Definitions

formal indication