hate speech

is a kind of conduct in the same way that performative speech (i.e. I now pronounce you married). On this basis, a speech-conduct distinction within speech policy is challengeable.

I will suggest that hate speech may be conceived of as a kind of conduct, and that the maintenance of a speech-conduct distinction within speech policy is challengeable. I advocate the integration of speech-act theory into considerations of speech policy, in order that speech may be conceived of as a type of conduct. Although it could be argued that this conception of speech renders expressive activity overly vulnerable to punitive and/or restrictive regulation, I will argue that locating speech policy within a capabilities-oriented approach overcomes this difficulty. P. 49

is a problematic concept because it can mean 'anything' and in practice is anything liberals don't agree with.

Take for example the ubiquitous movements against hate speech. Well the problem with hate speech is that it can mean ANYTHING. In practice, hate speech is anything liberals don't agree with. Remember, I'm hate speech according to professors and campus crybabies.

is always in conflict with free speech principles and policy makers are always forced to strike a proper 'balance' between the right to free speech and the right to live a life free from harassment and intimidation.

However, any regulation of hate speech, comes immediately into conflict with the free speech principle. How is it possible to devise a policy capable of acknowledging that speech in general ought to be free from restriction, and at the same time capable of defining hate speech precisely enough to allow its regulation' These competing policy demands tend to be framed by policy makers on speech in terms of striking a proper 'balance'. That is, hate speech policy makers tend to express a desire to achieve a 'balance' between the right to free speech and the right to live a life free from harassment and intimidation. This can also be expressed as a 'balance' between the policy demand to restrain from interfering in the exercise of the speech liberty and the policy demand to interfere in some instances of the exercise of the speech liberty to prevent or moderate the harms of hate speech.

is not alone in being subject to regulation, but rather sits alongside defamation, obscenity, commercial speech and incitement to commit a criminal act.

On the other hand, it can be acknowledged that many types of speech are already subject to regulation, including defamation, obscenity, commercial speech and incitement to commit a criminal act.

is speech that contributes to a climate of hatred and violence towards marginalized and disempowered sectors of the community, thus violating the basic human dignity of its victims.

In 1948, in response to the horrors perpetrated by Nazi Germany, the General Assembly of the United Nations ushered in a new era of human rights protection in international law by adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. During the intervening half century Western liberal democracies have embraced the ideals of non-discrimination and equal protection before the law. In this context 'vilification', or 'hate speech', is regarded as speech which is particularly harmful because it contributes to a climate of hatred and violence towards marginalised and disempowered sectors of the community. It violates the basic human dignity of its victims.

1s 2est is whether the utterance could incite an ordinary, reasonable person not immune from susceptibility to incitement nor holding racially prejudicial views, to hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule (not that they had been so incited).

Also, in Harou-Sourdon, the Tribunal adopted an objective standard to determine whether an utterance was considered an offence. The test was whether the utterance could incite an ordinary, reasonable person not immune from susceptibility to incitement nor holding racially prejudicial views, to hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule (not that they had been so incited). The context of the statement was taken into account in determining the incitement potential, including such factors as the length of the vilifying utterance compared with other utterances, and the tone of the discussion and whether repetition of the vilification occurred.

 Democrats cannot conceive of as existing towards Christians because, in their eyes, Christians always deserve it.

Democrats cannot conceive of "hate speech" towards Christians because, in their eyes, Christians always deserve it.

hate speech, n.Definitions

hate speech