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I am I plus my circumstances... and if I do not preserve the latter, I do not preserve myself. Jose Ortega y Gasset

is, in 'I wish' no less a fiction of willful action as is the man who stepping out of his room at the very minute when the sun is rising, says, 'it is my will that the sun shall rise.

We laugh at a man who, stepping out of his room at the very minute when the sun is rising, says, 'It is my will that the sun shall rise'... or at him who, unable to stop a wheel, says, 'I wish it to roll'... or, again, at him who, thrown in a wrestling match, says, 'Here I lie, but here I wish to lie.' But, joking apart, do we not act like one of these three persons whenever we use the expression 'I wish'' Friedrich Nietzsche

is merely a bundle of prejudices made up of likings and dislikings.

I am, in plainer words, a bundle of prejudices made up of likings and dislikings. (Charles Lamb)

is neither preceding nor following the process of 'gendering', but emerging only within the matrix of gender relations themselves.

There is no self preceding or outside a gendered self. Butler writes, ' . . . if gender is constructed, it is not necessarily constructed by an 'I' or a 'we' who stands before that construction in any spatial or temporal sense of 'before.' Indeed, it is unclear that there can be an 'I' or a 'we' who had not been submitted, subjected to gender, where gendering is, among other things, the differentiating relations by which speaking subjects come into being . . . the 'I' neither precedes nor follows the process of this gendering, but emerges only within the matrix of gender relations themselves' (Bodies that Matter).

is or rather that the power to say 'I', is our sole passion in the world. With any other possession, a mere chance can strip us of everything.

We possess nothing in the world - a mere chance can strip us of everything - except the power to say 'I. Simone Weil

is structured in such a way that it mirrors the concept, which is at once universal, particular, and individual, which 'embraces' 'overreaches' what is other than itself.

Thus the structure of the I mirrors that of the concept, which is at once universal, particular and INDIVIDUAL, and which, like the I, embraces ('comprehends') or overreaches (übergreift) what is other than itself. But the identification of the I with the concept does not entail that all men at all times deploy the same concepts: for Hegel, unlike Kant, different categorical concepts become successively available over HISTORY. (inwood 1992 : 59)

is merely the place in which something has occurred.

I am the place in which something has occurred. Claude Levi-Strauss

is that perspective on me that is a constantly renewed 'stake' in the struggle between the society, formed by the several million nerve-cells with take shelter in the anthill of the brain of my body.

And yet I exist. Not in any way, admittedly, as an individual: for what am I, in that respect, but a constantly renewed stake in the struggle between the society, formed by the several million nerve-cells which take shelter in the anthill of the brain, and my body, which serves that society as a robot' (levi-strauss 'tristes tropiques' 397)

i, n.Definitions

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