Anchor

Are Mostly Expectations

Become More Real Through Repetition

Become More Real When Named

Become Real Through Recognition

Become Real Through Repetition

Create Attachment

Create Belonging

Create Divergence

Exist Mostly In The Mind

Grow In Darkness

Harden

Have No Bottom

Make You Who You Are

Need A Label

Need A Signature

Need Boundaries

Need Defense

Need Interpretation To Exist

Need Protection

Only Exist Because We Agreed

Only Mean Something To One Person

Outlive Evidence

Persist Through Change

Refuse To Stay Finished

Resist Completion

Say You Belong

identity

dean

dad joke

brain in a vat

mind-body problem

trolley problem

one-liner

irony

Kool-Aid

Theseus' ship

bird

gender

identity politics

transgender

horse

pigeon

cloning

identification

K-9 unit

sniffing butts

agency

enslavement

slave

slavery

victimhood

existence

reincarnation

subject - object

form - content

materiality

Japanese culture

Ship of Theseus

is a form of subjugation and a way of exercising power over people and preventing them from moving outside fixed boundaries.

favours the dissolution of identity, rather than its creation or maintenance. He sees identity as a form of subjugation and a way of exercising power over people and preventing them from moving outside fixed boundaries.

is a state of being where there's nothing to write about, where one contains all subjects as potential, instead of being subjected to events.

I'm not sure what I mean by identity, but one of the things it means is: a state of being where there's nothing to write about. That is, where one contains all subjects as potential, instead of being subjected to events.

is absolutely negativity because the notion has its complete external objectivity in nature.

identity is absolute negativity because the notion has its complete external objectivity in nature.

is always contingent and precarious, temporarily fixed at the intersection of various subject positions, constructed by a diversity of discourses among which there is no necessary relation, but rather a constant movement of overdetermination and displacement.

As Mouffe expounds, We can thus conceive the social agent as constituted by an ensemble of 'subject positions' that can never be totally fixed in a closed system of differences, constructed by a diversity of discourses among which there is no necessary relation, but rather a constant movement of overdetermination and displacement. The 'identity' of such a multiple and contradictory subject is therefore always contingent and precarious, temporarily fixed at the intersection of those subject positions. ( 1993, 77) (p. 338)

is an act. It is not something permanent, given, or substantial that one has, but is something one has to become, to seek out in an open process of exposure to others and to internal difference.

Ultimately, for Nancy, one does not have an identity but has to become one. One can never return to a self-same identity but can only seek to locate oneself within difference and singularity. Nancy shows the impasse of a certain conception of identity that he calls the 'identity of the identifiable,' which refers to some permanent, given, substantial identity. In opposition to such identity, Nancy offers the identity of whatever or whoever invents itself in an open process of exposure to others and internal difference. Hence, an identity is never given but 'makes itself by seeking and inventing itself.' One does not have an identity, but is an identity.Identity is an act, not a state.

is difference which pulsates within itself but does not move, inwardly vibrates, yet is at rest. It is self-identical for the differences are tautological... they are differences that are none.

it pulsates within itself but does not move, inwardly vibrates, yet is at rest. It is self-identical, for the differences are tautological... they are differences that are none. (hegel 'phenomenology : 100)

is, for the presocratics, to be differentiated while for plato difference is to be identified.

We could say that the Pre-Socratics differentiate identity, while Plato identifies difference. This is perhaps the source of Lacan's preference for Heraclitus. (Badiou 'lacan and the pre-socratics pdf)

is itself a radical difference, not a simple reification as is often presumed in that identity always emerges only through a process of self-relating, of negating all determinate properties.

I think that Adorno for my taste gets too much caught in a kind of a, what I call, 'die schlechte Unendlichkeit,' bad infinity, you know. That it's always open, 'ganz andere,' totally other, endless process and so on. I think the point is not to criticize identity. The point is to see how identity itself is a radical difference. This is the Hegelian theory of identity. What is identity' Identity emerges only through self-relating which basically negates all determinate properties and so on. How do we become a person' By establishing a negative self-relation. So I think that I see but I read Adorno´s 'Negative dialectics' so that the identity by itself is split into identity and non-identity.

identity, n.Definitions

identity