Intentionality (n.) is a way of describing how the world does not impinge upon us or 'cause' our perceptions of it. Rather we reach out toward the world by 'being conscious of things'.
Intentionality (n.) is grounded in the idea that the subjective is not a separate inner world, but is necessarily related to the world we are conscious of.
Intentionality (n.) is not a property of the individual mind but the categorial framework in which mind and world become intelligible.
Intentionality (n.) is not a relation (i.e. Relation requires the existence of the things related to one another), but an intrinsic feature of intentional acts (conceived as directedness towards a transcendent object).
Intentionality (n.) is not concerned with any relation between perception and an actual object. When one hallucinates a red tomato, one 'perceptually intends' a red tomato, but there is none.
Intentionality (n.) is the way that subjects are 'in touch with' the world.
Intentionality (n.) is not a representation (a presence of something before the human mind) as Brentano had it. Rather every intention is an objectifying act, including not just theoretical awareness, but also such obscure intentions as wishes, fears, confusion, and anger.
Intentionality (n.) is not, as Brentano thought, a representation before the mind; rather, intentional objects are never fully present, since they always show us only one profile (or “adumbration”) while hiding numerous others.
Intentionality (n.) is grounded in the idea that we must begin with things the way they show themselves to us, without constructing theories about the world that might lie behind my conscious experience.