metaphysics

logical positivism

philosophy major

David Hume

philosophy

Rene Descartes

epistemology

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Baruch Spinoza

skeptic

Immanuel Kant

reality

aesthetics

is 'logocentric,' meaning that it has privileged speech (because of the presumed proximity of the speaking subject to the word spoken) over writing (characterized through the 'dangerous' traits of loss and absence.

For Derrida, metaphysics is 'logocentric,' meaning that it has privileged speech (because of the presumed proximity of the speaking subject to the word spoken) over writing (characterized through the 'dangerous' traits of loss and absence . . .

is a concern with things or concepts abstracted from their interconnection with other things (concepts) and as static 'self-identical' objects rather than processes and self-contradictory concepts.

For Hegel and for Marxist, metaphysics meant dealing with things or concepts abstracted from their interconnection with other things (concepts) and as static 'self-identical' objects, rather than processes and self-contradictory concepts. For Positivism and most bourgeois philosophy today, Metaphysics is used in the sense given to it by Kant, meaning concern with objects which are 'not possible objects of experience'. (marxist.org)

for Hegel metaphysics is a logic or theory of thought, for Aristotle thought simply expresses (or fails to express) the way things are.

is a process of life in which above all 'value judgements' assert themselves, a movement in which crippling, subjugating, life-denying 'values' achieve supremacy.

For Nietzsche metaphysics is a process of life in which above all 'value judgements' assert themselves, a movement in which crippling, subjugating, life-denying 'values' achieve supremacy. Metaphysics is understood as a process of life . . .

is a strange animal: Classically concerned with reality, substances, universals, and eternity, criticized as idealistic, denounced as foundational, and uncovered as socially stabilizing, reverted to interpretation, process, singularities, and novelty, mutating in its methods and conceptuality.

Metaphysics is a strange animal: Classically concerned with reality, substances, universals, and eternity, criticized as idealistic, denounced as foundational, and uncovered as socially stabilizing, reverted to interpretation, process, singularities, and novelty, mutating in its methods and conceptuality it is still alive, that is, producing new forms of questions vital to cultural, social, and ecological challenges of our time. (Faber beyond metaphysics)

is a way of thinking that, building on ontological 'evidences' which remain unaccounted for, looks at beings as merely existing entities and at reality as the presence of things that can be defined and theorized by separating a subject and an object of inquiry, in this way forgetting, or hiding, being as such.

For Heidegger, metaphysics is a way of thinking that, building on ontological 'evidences' that remain unaccounted for, looks at beings as merely existing entities and at reality as the presence of things that can be defined and theorized by separating a subject and an object of inquiry, in this way forgetting, or hiding, Being as such. Being is understood in terms of abstraction or generalization from actual beings, instead of what makes beings possible.

is an attempt to grasp and secure being. It is an attempt at pure visibility and an attack on the hidden.

Metaphysics is an attempt to grasp and to secure Being. The attack on the hidden, on what Heidegger terms the earth, is thus part of i t s essence. The metaphysical tendency reaches i t s final stage, decisive for the shape of our world, with Descartes. Man's reason is made the measure of reality: only what can be known clearly and distinctly can be said to be and what can be known in this manner can also be manipulated. Metaphysics triumphs over the earth, and thus over Being, in technology. Losing the earth, man loses his own essence to his domineering spirit and decays. 'Today a man without uniform already makes the impression of the uncanny, which no longer belongs.'26' (Harries 1977:508).

is characterized by questions such as 'where is the dog'' In such a way that it neglects the very questions it begs such as 'whose dog' Which dog' Dog in what sense'.

If we again ask our question 'What is a thing'' we realize that this question is not in good order, because what should be put into question, that is, the 'thing,' is ambiguous in its meaning. What is to be put into question must be sufficiently defined to become questionable in the right way. 'where is the dog'' 'the dog' cannot be searched for if I do not know whether it is our dog or the neighbor's. 'what is a thing'' thing in what sense -in the limited, the wider, or the widest' (heidegger 'what is a thing'' 6)

metaphysics, n.Definitions

metaphysics