Change When Someone Walks In

Dim When Noticed

Need Charging

Turn Sour

mood

banana

trivia

emotion

manic depressive

mood swing

drug

listening to music

perception

coffee

misanthropy

dinner party

bad mood

apathy

motivatedness

drinking

overthinking

is a primordial kind of being for dasein, in which dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of disclosure.

Ontologically mood is a primordial kind of being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of disclosure. (175) [ 1361 (dreyfus : being in the world' 173)

is impossible to get behind, or to get clear about, or to get clear of. I am always surrounded by objects that matter in some specific way.

As Heidegger points out, we cannot get behind our moods... we cannot get clear about them, and we cannot get clear of them. 'Dasein alwayshassomemood'(173)[1341. I am always already surrounded by objects that matter in some specific way. (dreyfus 'being in the world' 173)

is like the Niger River in Africa... no one knows its source, no one knows its outlet'only its reach is known.

Mood is like the Niger River in Africa... no one knows its source, no one knows its outlet'only its reach is known!

is like the weather. It settles in and tends to perpetuate itself. For example, when I am annoyed, new events, even those which when I am joyful show up as challenging or amusing, show up as grounds for further annoyance.

In this way moods are like the weather. On a sunny day not only are all present objects bright, but it is difficult to imagine a drab world, and, conversely on dull days everything that can show up is dull, and so is everything one can envisage. Indeed, far from being fleeting as the tradition has supposed, moods settle in like the weather and tend to perpetuate themselves. For example, when I am annoyed, new events, even those which when I am joyful show up as challenging or amusing, show up as grounds for further annoyance.AsHeidegger puts the general point: (dreyfus 'being in the world' : 174)

is neither a feeling nor a set of objective movements. It is a unified style of activity in an appropriate situation. When one is afraid, one does not merely feel fearful, nor is fear merely the movement of cringing... fear is cringing in an appropriate context.

Gilbert Ryle and Ludwig Wittgenstein have therefore suggested a modified behaviorist approach. Wittgenstein points out that 'expecting,' for example, is neither a feeling, nor a set of objective movements. It is a certain unified style of activity in an appropriate situation. For example, when one is afraid, one does not merely feel fearful, nor is fear merely the movement of cringing... fear is cringing in an appropriate context. (dreyfus 'being in the world' : 172)

is not a first-person, subjective state. Thus our cartesian tradition has forced us to conclude that it must then be some kind of third-person, objective behavior.

But if a mood is not a first-person, subjective state, our Cartesian tradition has prepared us to think that it must then be some kind of third-person, objective behavior. The behaviorist approach which tries to reduce all psychological states to physical movements, however, is unable to account for the intentionality of moods.

is not a psychological experience in us. Rather it is something we are 'in'. We are 'in' a mood just as we are 'in' trouble, or 'in' a pinch.

Heidegger would no doubt appreciate the fact that we ordinarily say we are in a mood, not that a mood is an experience in us. (dreyfus 'being in the world' : 169)

is not related to the psychical and is not itself an inner condition which then reaches forth in an enigmatical way and puts its mark on things and persons. It comes neither from 'outside' nor from 'inside' but arises out of being-in-the-world, as a way of such being.

A mood is not related to the psychical . . . and is not itself an inner condition which then reaches forth in an enigmatical way and puts its mark on things and persons. . . . It comes neither from 'outside'nor from 'inside,' but arises out of being-in-the-world,as a way of such being. (176, my italics)[137, 1361 (heid. . . in drey..172)

mood, n.Definitions

mood