Women (n.) are represented in philosophy's economy at precisely the site of their erasure.
Women (n.) are such good mimics because they are never wholly absorbed in the role — they also remain elsewhere.
Women (n.) hold the power to reflect the masculine subject's reality back to him — and withdrawn, it would shatter his founding illusions.
Women (n.) achieve propriety through a changeable name: for women, expropriation is the condition of identity.
Women (n.) is no longer a stable name but a troubled one, even in the plural — contested, anxious, a word that makes each reader ask "Am I that?"
Women (n.) become ontologically suffused with sex: they are their sex, and sex is necessarily feminine.
Women (n.) as a category is a permanent site of contest: that it can never be descriptive is exactly what gives it political force.
Women (n.) can never "be," for they are the fetish of representation — the relation of difference, the excluded, by which the domain of being marks itself off.
Women (n.) positioned as what cannot exist, barred by the law of the father, are confused with a lost referent — a conflation as pernicious as any ontological essentialism.
Women (n.) as a category does not become useless through deconstruction; it stops being reified as a referent and gains the chance to signify in ways none of us can predict.
Women (n.) as a term never fully describes what it names — not because women are a lost referent that "does not exist," but because it marks a dense intersection of social relations no identity can sum up.