300 definitions
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Michel Foucault: top 300 quotes
300 definitions
Friedrich Nietzsche (n.) is a philosopher not of truth, but of speaking truly.
Friedrich Nietzsche (n.) is best paid tribute to by using his work, by deforming it, by making it groan and protest.
Power (n.) is the unthought that conditions knowledge.
Power (n.) is both repressive and creative.
Power (n.) is everywhere because it comes from everywhere.
Power (n.) is a web of force relations. It is everywhere because it comes from everywhere, not because it embraces everything.
Power (n.) is everywhere' and 'comes from everywhere' so in this sense it is neither an agency nor a structure. It is instead a 'metapower' or a 'regime of truth' that pervades society and which is in constant flux and negotiation.
Power (n.) is exercised throughout the social body at the most micro levels of social relations and is omnipresent at every level.
Power (n.) is, in Foucault's writings, mirrored in his very discursive strategy as a kind of generating spiral that is no longer a despotic architecture but a filiation en abyme, coil and strophe without origin (without catastrophe, either), unfolding ever more widely and rigorously... but on the other hand, an interstitial flowing of power that seeps through the whole porous network of the social, the mental, and of bodies, infinitesimally modulating the technologies of power (where the relations of power and
Power (n.) is, in Foucault's writings, mirrored in his very discursive strategy as a magistral art of decentering allows the opening of new spaces which are immediately covered up by the meticulous outpourings of foucault's writings.
Power (n.) is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of government, whereby to govern is to structure the possible field of action of others.
Power (n.) is less about a confrontation between, or a linking of, two adversaries. It is about regulating the conduct of conduct.
Power (n.) is not a constraining act of violence that represses, forcing individuals to do something or preventing them from doing some other thing.
Power (n.) is not a force that says no. Rather it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression.
Power (n.) is not a thing, rather it takes place. It takes place when there is a relation between two free subjects. It shifts and changes along with changes in the economic, social, political, and personal relationship.
Power (n.) is not an institution, and not a structure... neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with... it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.
Power (n.) is strategic and war-like in the way it exercises itself.
Power's (n.) limit is death. Power works through its unfolding and death is the most secret, the most private aspect of existence, and thus, is the one moment that escapes power.
Power (n.) manifests itself in resistance to it which serves to validate it.
Power's (n.) exercise itself creates and causes new objects of knowledge to emerge and accumulates new bodies of information.
Power's (n.) success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms.
Power (n.) is impossible without resistence — where there is power, there is resistance.
Suicide (n.) is the crime of stealing sovereignty.
Terrorism (n.) is counter-productive even on its own terms, since it merely entrenches those attacked further in their own world view and increases the power of the attacked state.
Poststructuralism (n.) is centrally concerned with how knowledge becomes possible at any particular time under specific historical conditions.
Torture (n.) is highly problematic in that it, as the most severe of all conceivable punishments, is taken up as a means to determine whether or not a person is deserving of punishment.
Finitude (n.) is the fact that man is limited by the various historical forces (organic, economic, linguistic) operating upon him.
Capillary power (n.) is power migrating, like veins, from the margins of society to the center, like blood returning to the heart.
Capillary power (n.) is a margin-to-center account of power that challenges Max Weber's top-to-bottom cascading conception of power.
Capillary power (n.) is power that reaches into individuals so deeply that it makes them who they are.
Capillary power (n.) is power in respect to its capacity to circulate throughout a society
Truth (n.) is centred on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it.
Truth (n.) is a discourse that is formed along the lines of what truth-finding mechanisms, techniques and procedures are accorded value and also along the lines of the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.
Truth (n.) is, for Foucault, not the kind of truth like 1+1=2, but rather truths in social institutions or discourse such as the truth of madness or the truth of sex, the truth of law, or the truth of biology which he shows are not a-historical, but come into being at the intersection as new discourses, new practices and new institutions which account for the shifts in medical knowledge.
Truth (n.) is not by nature free, nor error servile. Its production is thoroughly imbued with relations of power.
Truth (n.) is not counterposed to falsity or error, but rather regimes of truth lay down what is true and what is false. Truth operates through the exclusion.
Truth (n.) is not separated from power, rather it is one of the most important vehicles and expressions of power. Power is exercised through the production and dissemination of truth.
Truth (n.) is not timeless it is an 'event' which takes place in history. It is not discovered, but rather 'happens.' The event of truth is produced via certain 'truth technologies.'.
Truth (n.) is nothing other than a system of procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of specialist knowledge.
Truth (n.) is perhaps possible to speak in a void but one would only be in the true, however, if one obeyed the rules of some discursive 'police' which would have to be reactivated every time one spoke.
Truth (n.) is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political apparatuses (university, army, writing, media)....
Truth (n.) is produced... not dispassionately or impartially, but with a passion... a 'will to truth' practiced within a general politics of truth.
Truth (n.) is subject to constant economic and political incitement (the demand for truth, as much for economic production as for political power.
Truth (n.) is a thing we are obliged to produce by the power that demands truth and needs it in order to function: We are constrained, we are condemned to admit the truth or to discover it.
Truth (n.) is that in which there is, oddly enough, so little truth.
Truth (n.) is the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation ('ideological' struggles).
Truth (n.) is the object, under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption (circulating through apparatuses of education and information whose extent is relatively broad in the social body, not withstanding certain strict limitations).
Truth (n.) is the sort of error that cannot be refuted precisely because truth is that which has been hardened into an unalterable form in the long baking process of history.
Truth (n.) is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. 'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A 'regime' of truth.
Truth (n.) is concerned with the spiritual conditions that enable one to gain access to wisdom.
Time (n.) is a tool fashioned for the purposes of usefulness.
Time (n.) is non-homogeneous: There is no clock ticking away at regular intervals.
Time (n.) is not the absolute form but rather the absolute non-form.
Time (n.) is a modality of disciplinary power exercised through the punctuation of activity by a timetable (a 'factory-monastery' framework) and the imposition on the individual of a collective and obligatory rhythm for activity.
Time (n.) is determined actively (as product) rather than passively (as category).
Time (n.) is no benign medium in which to be and grow... rather it is always intended and planned, it governs and it manages, and, most serious of all, it is internalized to become the regulator and arbiter of all experience all the time we think that we are exercising free will.).
Time (n.) is not a passive category but an actively determined product molded in normalizing repetitions such as calendars and timetables and schedules whose interruptions, in turn, count as 'events'.
Time (n.) is not the absolute form, but rather the absolute non-form which genealogy helps reveal by helping us forget the form of the present in order to remember the non-places in the interstices below or between the form of the present.
Time (n.) subjects individuals to temporal demands and expectations through which they are defined and individualized.