Agency is a moral concession, a false intellectual conceit suggesting that just by showing that one could have done otherwise is the same as explaining what the actor actually did.
Agency is a moral concession, not a social fact. That is, knowing someone's intentions does not get us much closer to explaining or predicting social outcomes, since intentions and outcomes are very loosely coupled.
Agency is like structure, not a cause, but rather the outcome, of complex system-environment entanglements.
Agency is not a social fact, rather, it is a moral concession, a manner of attributing value to the space between intentions and outcomes.
Agency is not the cause of some observation, but the outcome and ultimately the name for what is attributed to an act.
Agency is often mistakenly assumed to be without structure simply because it is often opposed to structure.
Agency - structure is a distinction from which one might step away to instead take a second-order position from which to observe the distinction's employment.
Hermeneutics is that which allows us to say: If explanation occurs between strangers, then hermeneutics occurs between intimates.
Hermeneutics is that which occurs between intimates, while what occurs between strangers is explanation.
An Intention is problematic in that it is difficult to determine if an intention is a reason or a cause, something that explains or something that defines an action, something that is an idle intention or initiates sore real action.
Sociology is concerned not with the difference between things and people but between the attribution of interpretivism or determinism.
A Thing is not strictly distinguished from a person, rather, what is distinguished is that which can be determined from that which can be interpreted.
