Teach You Philosophy

logic

phenomenology

ology (the study of)

philosophy

light bulb joke

I like my [x] like I like my [y]

syllogism

ancient greek philosophy

is a form of optimism, as all philosophers are apologist for knowledge, believing that it must be in the highest degree useful.

There has hitherto been no philosopher in whose hands philosophy has not become an apologia for knowledge... on this point at least each of them is an optimist, inasmuch as he believes that knowledge must be in the highest degree useful. They are all tyrannized over by logic: and logic is by its nature optimism. (Nietzsche 'human all too' :14)

is a normative discipline such that to talk about concepts is talk about how we should talk and think, not just about how we actually do.

Frege followed Kant in emphasizing that logic (and semantics) is a normative discipline: talk about concepts is talk about how we should talk and think, not just about how we actually do. This insight is also very important for me. (Brandom 'interview 1999 pdf)

is a very elegant tool that we've got a lot of mileage out of for two thousand years or so. -the trouble is, when you apply it to crabs and porpoises, and butterflies. . . .. You know, to all those pretty things. . . Logic won't quite do because the fabric of living things is not put together by logic.

Logic is a very elegant tool,' he said, 'and we've got a lot of mileage out of it for two thousand years or so. The trouble is, you know, when you apply it to crabs and porpoises, and butter flies and habit formation'-his voice trailed off, and he added after a pause, looking out over the ocean-'you know, to all those pretty things'-and now, looking straight at me

is always defeated by itself, that is to say, by the insignificance of the cases on which it thrives.

Logic is always defeated by itself, that is to say, by the insignificance of the cases on which it thrives.'

is, as compared with induction, a flawed and unfirm grounding for the sciences insofar as it consist ultimately in words which are symbols of notions which might be confused.

The Syllogism consist of propositions, propositions consist of words, words are symbols of notions. Therefore if the notions themselves (which is the root of the matter) are confused and over-hastily abstracted from the facts, there can be no firmness in the superstructure. Our only hope therefore lies in a true induction.Francis Bacon

is concerned not with the 'recognition of the true' but to show and work out the 'complications' in our thinking. It is concerned not with moving between true sentences, but with the creation of new concepts.

Deleuze's logic is thus concerned not with the 'recognition of the true,' but with another problem, another conception of problems to show and work out the 'complications' in our thinking. It is a logic of the 'creation of concepts' that derive from problematizations, and it has other pragmatic presuppositions and aims than a logic that says how to move from some true sentences to others, or to pass from indetermination to a dialectical whole, or to arrive at a priori categories of thought. (Rajchman 2000 : 51).

is concerned not with the 'recognition of the true' but with the 'creation of concepts'.

Deleuze's logic is thus concerned not with the 'recognition of the true,' but with another problem, another conception of problems to show and work out the 'complications' in our thinking. It is a logic of the 'creation of concepts' that derive from problematizations, and it has other pragmatic presuppositions and aims than a logic that says how to move from some true sentences to others, or to pass from indetermination to a dialectical whole, or to arrive at a priori categories of thought. (Rajchman 2000 : 51)

is concerned to show and work out the 'complications' in our thinking. It is not about recognizing or calculating the true, but with complicating, surprising.

logic is thus concerned not with the 'recognition of the true,' but with another problem, another conception of problems to show and work out the 'complications' in our thinking. It is a logic of the 'creation of concepts' that derive from problematizations, and it has other pragmatic presuppositions and aims than a logic that says how to move from some true sentences to others, or to pass from indetermination to a dialectical whole, or to arrive at a priori categories of thought. If conceived as a machine, it would not be not a calculating or computing machine a Turing machine but rather a sort of 'complicating' machine, moving between usual distinctions, surprising us, attaining an irreducible disparity, an incalculable chance, more akin to Alfred Jarry's 'tempo-mobiles' than Jerry Fodor's 'modules.'4 Indeed it leads Deleuze to another view of the brain and cognition than the kind of artificial intelligence that serves only to go back to 'the most stubborn logic' of recognition and representation. (51)

logic, n.All

logic