world

trivia

is (like objects and people as well) not an absolute thing, but a phenomena of perception. It requires expounding all the time because each person perceives life and death for himself and has a curiosity about the perceptions of others.

The people in the world, and the objects in it, and the world as a whole, are not absolute things, but on the contrary, are the phenomena of perception. . . If we were all alike: if we were millions of people saying do, re, mi, in unison, One poet would be enough. . . But we are not alone, and everything needs expounding all the time because, as people live and die, each one perceiving life and death for himself, and mostly by and in himself, there develops a curiosity about the perceptions of others. This is what makes it possible to go on saying new things about old things. Wallace Stevens

is a concrete concept or an idea, not some enormous aggregate of things as they actually are, but rather it is an aggregate of all objects of possible experience.

At first Kant adopted the conception of world as formulated in the tradition and particularly in the school of Leibniz. In the Dissertation of 1770 he defines world still in terms of a multiplicity of substances, that are somehow coordinated and constitute an entirety which is the absolute totality of all conjoined parts. Later he defines vorld as the totality of all finite things. Yet this is to be understood in the final analysis in a transcendental sense... world means now no more than the aggregate of all appearances. i.e .. the aggregate of all objects of possible experience. Thus for Kant the concept of world does not refer to a concatenation of things in themselves... rather it is a transcendental aggregate of things taken as appearances. What is exhibited in the concept of world is not a coordination of substances. but a subord ination of all the conditions of synthesis, ascending to the unconditioned. The concept of world cannot be defined as a rational representation which conceptually is indeterminate... rather it is an idea. a pure synthetic concept of reason, which as such is to be distinguished from concepts of understanding. Thus the 'concept' of world is the representation of an unconditioned totality... yet it does not represent the genuinely unconditioned, since the totality that is thought in it remains related to the appearances which are the sole possible objects of finite knowledge.

is a part of dasein's being (i.e. Part of the everyday existence which we each can claim to have). It is something which dwells alongside dasein in the same way that the entities of the world dwell alongside dasein.

Therefore approach would also involve us having to concede that the 'world' is, in fact, also a part of Dasein's Being, i.e., something which dwells alongside Dasein in the same way that the entities of the world dwell alongside Dasein [ref. 12, page 80]. (munday)

is a perpetual caricature of itself... at every moment it is the mockery and the contradiction of what it is pretending to be.

The world is a perpetual caricature of itself... at every moment it is the mockery and the contradiction of what it is pretending to be. George Santayana

is a phenomena to which we can address ourselves directly in terms of its being the determinate for the ontological meaning for all of the entities within the world, and not just something which is determined by them as hitherto assumed.

Perhaps we should approach this inquiry from a different direction and ask ourselves if it possible to address ourselves to the phenomenon of world,' directly in terms of its being the determinate for the ontological meaning for all of the entities within the world, and not just something which is determined by them as hitherto assumed. (munday)

is a realm of meaning and corresponding practices rather than a collection of objects.

For Heidegger worlds are realms of meaning and corresponding practices rather than collections of objects as in conventional usage. A world is 'disclosed' according to Heidegger in the sense that the orientation of the subject opens up a coherent perspective on reality. (Feenberg 2003 : html)

is a totality of interrelated pieces of meaningful equipment which are used to carry out a task (hammering) intended to achieve a purpose (building a house) such that identities are enabled (being a carpenter).

A world, for Heidegger,' the authors write, '. . . is a totality of interrelated pieces of equipment, each used to carry out a specific task such as hammering in a nail. These tasks are undertaken so as to achieve certain purposes, such as building a house. Finally, this activity enables those performing it to have identities, such as being a carpenter' (Spinosa, et al., 1997: 17). (Feenberg 2003: html)

is a whole, a life fulfilling the purposes of our ideas. It is that or it is nothing.

the empirical world is a whole, a life fulfilling the purposes of our ideas. It is that or it is nothing.' (WI, 1:368)

world, n.All

world