Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠both physical and moral. It is impossible to separate the two.

Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠simply what we call it when we perceive a 'before and an 'after.'

Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠1st, an intuition such that it does not arise from, but is presupposed by the senses.

Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠2nd, an intuition such that you conceive all actual things as situated in time, and not as contained under the general concept of time, as under a common characteristic mark.

Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠3rd, an intuition, one which, since it is prior to sensation, is a pure intuition.

Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠4th, an intuition and a continuous magnitude, and moments of time are not parts of time 'but limits with time between them'.

Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠5th, not something objective and real, and is neither a substance, nor an accident, nor a relation. It is a necessary subjective condition.

Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠6th, not simply imaginary, but supplies the only condition under which objects of the sense can be co-ordinated.

Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠7th, an absolutely first formal principle of the sensible world without which our intuition of objects of sense would not be possible.

Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠a partially analyzable concept, which is not open to a real definition, but only a nominal one.

Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠able to defined only nominally: That is, as an analysis of the ways in which the word 'time' could be used and not a real definition, that is, a definition of the nature of time.

Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠an antecedent of the consciousness of representations in experience. It is the formal condition of the mode according to which objects are placed in the mind lies at the foundation of them. It contains relations of the successive, the coexistent, and the permanent.

Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠antecedent of the consciousness of representations in experience.

Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠defined such that I can say that my representations follow one another, or are successive, or, as it may be, coexistent, or permanent, but this means only that we are conscious of them as in succession, coexistent, or permanent.

Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠eternal time and temporal events are oriented towards it.

Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not a thing in itself, nor is it any objective determination pertaining to, or inherent in things.

Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not a thing with reality, but more like a rule which must be met in order to have reality and any kinds of phenomenon at all. If space (or the extension of things) is a necessary 'rule' for conceiving of any reality outside of my body, time concerns not only external phenomena 'out there', but also all internal acts of the mind 'in here'.

Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not something which subsist of itself, or which inheres in things as an objective determination. It is merely the subjective condition under which all our intuitions take place : The form of the inward intuition is represented prior to objects, and consequently a priori.

Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not to be regarded as an object, but as the mode of representation of myself as an object. If I were another kind of being, without this condition of sensibility, then those very determinations which we now represent to ourselves as changes, (insofar as it sits in time), and so forth, would not appear.

Time (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠nothing else than the form of all phenomena of the internal sense, that is, 'the form of our internal intuition'.

Morality (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠about making correct choices, ethics is about proper reasoning.

Morality (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not concerned with happiness, but duty.

Morality (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not properly the doctrine how we may make ourselves happy, but how we may make ourselves worthy of happiness.

Morality (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠grounded in the idea that an action is good not because it has good results, or because it is wise, but because it is done in obedience to this inner sense of duty.

Morality (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠grounded in treating humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, in every case as an end, never only as a means.

Morality (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠grounded in the categorical imperative in us, the unconditional command of our conscience, to "act as if the maxim of our action were to become by our will a universal law of nature.

Freedom (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠grounded not in inclination, but in duty.

Freedom (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not in accord with inclination but with duty, which gives rise to the consciousness of freedom. The glorious order, in turn, gives rise to belief in a wise and great 'author'.

Freedom (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠alone the unoriginated birthright of man ; it belongs to him by force of his humanity, and is in dependence on the will and coaction of every other, in so far as this consists with every other person’s freedom.

Freedom (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠that faculty which enlarges the usefulness of all other faculties.

Anthropology (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠pragmatic (in contrast to the technical and the moral) and it aligns with prudence, which is a knowledge that furthers our happiness or well-being, especially through the use we make of other people.

Anthropology (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the doctrine of systematically formulated knowledge of the human being. It is a study that involves both physiological and pragmatic aspects.

Anthropology (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠an empirical and practical account of the powers of the human mind in general and the vocation of the human race.

Anthropology (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠completely empirical. As such, it is not 'philosophical anthropology' since philosophy is an entirely rational and non-empirical enterprise.

Anthropology (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠concerned with a pragmatic knowledge of the world rather than a scholastic knowledge of the world. While scholastic knowledge concerns being acquainted with the world as a spectator (die weltkennen), a truly pragmatic knowledge of human nature involves 'having a world' as a participant (welthaben).

Anthropology (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not a study of other cultures in the sense of comparative ethnography, rather it draws on such varied sources as plays, poetry, history, novels, physiology, and yes, it also makes use of travel accounts of distant regions.