essence

is (as eidos) not something unique for each object. On the contrary, an essence is something that can be shared by many objects.

All these features Husserl calls eidos (plural: eide), or essences. When Husserl writes about essences, he is hence not using the word as a label for something that is unique for each object, what is sometimes called individual essence. On the contrary, an essence is for him something that can be shared by many objects. (føllesdal in dreyfus 'companion to phenomenology' 106)

is a thing how it is in its conceptual core. The essence is less an impenetrable core than a nebulous indeterminateness.

essential / essence (wesentlich, w. (The essence of a thing is what it really is, the thing in itself, its conceptual core. Essence contrasts with 'being' in a wide sense, and with appearance. In so far as essence is indeterminate, it is 'other than' appearance... in so far as it becomes determinate, the relation of essence to appearance is reciprocal, they are correlates. In application to consciousness, essence means (per Pinkard) its kind of rationality.). Hegel.

is commonplace and the intuition of essence is commonplace.

In this view, essence is commonplace and the intuition of essence is commonplace. What disturbs the lucidity of the scene is what Husserl calls the 'naturalizing' of consciousness: the introduction of facticity the facticity of nature where it does not belong. That 'naturalizing' Husserl calls 'psychologism': the decisive blurring of the difference between essence and event, intuition and actuality. Thus, (Natanson 1998 : 21)

is conceived only as the essence of a particular 'appearance,' whose factual form is viewed with regard to what is in itself and what could be (but is not in fact).

As Marcuse puts it, for Marx an essence is not transcendental or absolute. Rather, it 'originates in history and changes in history.' Or, more elaborately, an essence is conceived only as the essence of a particular 'appearance,' whose factual form is viewed with regard to what is in itself and what could be (but is not in fact).

is, in man, wrongheadedly discussed like the essence of a paper-knife which is necessarily preceded by a conception and procedure, serving as an example of a universal conception.

If one considers an article of manufacture as, for example, a book or a paper-knife one sees that it has been made by an artisan who had a conception of it... and he has paid attention, equally, to the conception of a paper-knife and to the pre-existent technique of production which is a part of that conception and is, at bottom, a formula. Thus the paper-knife is at the same time an article producible in a certain manner and one which, on the other hand, serves a definite purpose, for one cannot suppose that a man would produce a paper-knife without knowing what it was for. Let us say, then, of the paperknife that its essence that is to say the sum of the formulae and the qualities which made its production and its definition possible precedes its existence. The presence of such-and-such a paper-knife or book is thus determined before my eyes. Here, then, we are viewing the world from a technical standpoint, and we can say that production precedes existence.

is infinity as the supersession of all distinctions, the pure movement of axial rotation, its self-repose being an absolutely restless infinity... independence itself, in which the differences of the movement are resolved, the simple essence of time which, in this equality with itself, has the stable shape of space.

Essence is infinity as the supersession of all distinctions, the pure movement of axial rotation, its self-repose being an absolutely restless infinity... independence itself, in which the dif ferences of the movement are resolved, the simple essence of Time which, in this equality with itself, has the stable shape of Space. (hegel 'phenomenology' 106)

is located in each individual thing or person. For this essence to be realized, it must be recognized consciously and community actually be.

For Marx, essence is located in each individual thing or person. For this essence to be realized, it must be recognized consciously and community actually be . . .

is not an end, but a means, a means requiring the field of 'ideality' in order to know and to conquer its facticity.

essence, n.All

essence