intentionality

is a kind of directedness or physical comportment whereby all thinking is a thinking 'about' -all willing is a willing 'of' the toward-which of this directedness is simultaneously given just as it is intended in the act in question.

We will attempt in a roundabout way to make clear the two decisive discoveries that will allow us to formulate Dilthey's question in a new phenomenological way: intentionality and categorial intuition. Intentionality is an aiming at something. In the Middle Ages, this expression was used to designate a characteristic of psychical comportment. All thinking is a thinking about something, all willing is a willing of something, all experience is an experience of something. This self-evident proposition is of fundamental significance. When we bring to mind this directedness toward something, the toward-which of this directedness is simultaneously given just as it is intended in the act in question. (heidegger 'struggle' : 161)

is a way of describing how the world does not impinge upon us or 'cause' our perceptions of it. Rather we reach out toward the world by 'being conscious of things'.

is always a kind of representation: a presence of something before the human mind.

a kind of representation: a presence of something before the human mind.

is fragile. It consist of acts which are rays of sensibility, not strands of steel with which bridges are built.

It would appear that intending the noema is a fragile act. This is not the case. The acts of intentionality are rays of sensibility, not strands of steel with which bridges are built. Stevens' poet is exposed when the public violates its province and comes between the poet and his poem. In phenomenological terms, the unity of intention is fractured when the noetic and noematic are sundered. (Natanson 1998 : 27)

is grounded in the idea that the subjective is not a separate inner world, but is necessarily related to the world we are conscious of.

The 'subjective' is not a separate inner world, but is necessarily related to the world we are conscious of. To make this point, Husserl took over a concept from the nineteenth century Austrian philosopher Franz Brentano (1837-1917): the concept of the 'intentionality' of consciousness. (matthews 2006: 6)

is narrowly defined as object-directedness. In a broader sense, it is defined as openness to the world or what is 'other'.

In a narrow sense, they define intentionality as object-directedness. In a broader sense, they define it as openness to the world or what is 'other' ('alterity').' (net),

is not a property of the individual mind but the categorial framework in which mind and world become intelligible.

According to Husserl, consciousness is our direct openness to the world, one that is governed categorially (normatively) rather than causally... that is, intentionality is not a property of the individual mind but the categorial framework in which mind and world become intelligible.' (safranski, Heidegger, 77)

is not a relation (i.e. Relation requires the existence of the things related to one another), but an intrinsic feature of intentional acts (conceived as directedness towards a transcendent object).

Intentionality is not a relation, but rather an intrinsic feature of intentional acts. Relations require the existence of their relata (the things related to one another), but this is not true of intentionality (conceived as directedness towards a transcendent object). The object of my belief can fail to exist (if my belief is, for example, about Father Christmas). On Husserl's picture, every intentional act has an intentional object, an object that the act is about, but they certainly needn't all have a real object (Husserl 2001, 127). (stanford:phen)

intentionality, n.All

intentionality