phenomena

thing-in-itself

Immanuel Kant

is connected to appearance. That is, a being assumes its radiance, and in that radiance it appears, and thus rises into unconcealment.

i: The Greeks were the first to experience and think of phaiftomena as phenomena. But in that experience it is thoroughly alien to the Greeks to press present beings into an opposing abjectness... phainesthai means to them that a being assumes its radiance, and in that radiance it appears. Thus appearance is still the basic trait of the presence of all present beings, as they rise into unconcealment. (heidegger 'a dialogue on language' : 38)

is, for early critical period Kant, simply 'objects of sensibility' as opposed to objects which can only be cognised through the intelligence.

Phenomena are distinguished from both noumena and appearances, but the terms in which Kant couched the distinction changed radically during his career. In his first work, LF (1747), Kant conventionally employs phenomenon in the sense of an external manifestation of an invisible force, as in the proposition 'motion is only the external phenomenon of the state of the body' (LF 3). While elements of this view persist even into the critical philosophy, by ID (1770) the terms of the distinction have shifted from phenomena being the external manifestation of invisible forces or objects, to them being simply 'objects of sensibility' as opposed to noumena or intelligible objects which can only be 'cognised through the intelligence' (ID 3). Kant also intimates a distinction between phenomena and appearances, with the term appearance being used to signify 'that which precedes the logical use of the understanding' and phenomena the 'objects of experience' which result from the comparison of appearances by the understanding (5). (317)

is, for early Kant, an external manifestation of an invisible force such that, for example, motion is merely the external phenomenon of the state of the body.

is, for the Greeks, connected to appearance. That is, a being assumes its radiance, and in that radiance it appears, and thus rises into unconcealment.

is not in possession of a nature, but rather an essence, an essence which can be grasped in an immediate seeing.

This, however, is understood as meaning that we remain in the pure phenomenological sphere and leave out of account relationships to nature and to the body experienced as a thing. The answer, then, is that if phenomena have no nature, they still have an essence, which can be grasped and adequately determined in an immediate seeing. ('husserl 'philosophy as rigorous' : 181)

is incapable of lying because there is nothing at all behind them: They simply are what they are. Therefore all entities must show themselves phenomenologically in themselves and for themselves with the kind of access that genuinely belongs to them.

1/ there is nothing behind phenomena and 2/ phenomena cannot lie. Therefore all entities must show themselves phenomenologically in themselves and for themselves with the kind of access that genuinely belongs to them. (munday)

is the objects of experience which result from the comparison of appearances by the understanding.

is only rare cases of visible things emerging from a dominant silent background of equipment.

Phenomena are only rare cases of visible things emerging from a dominant silent background of equipment.

phenomena, n.All

phenomena