origin

knowledge

philosophy

ology (the study of)

philology

biology

moon

trivia

marijuana

is (in for example the case of the potter's wheel) not origin in terms of the mechanical device nor in terms of the material object, but rather as 'a manner of proceeding' which may avail itself of a number of different devices.

THE ORIGIN OF THE POTTERS WHEEL -AN INVENTION IS (1) NEITHER SIMPLY A NEW MECHANICAL DEVICE, (2) NOR A MATERIAL OBJECT THAT CAN BE DESCRIBED OBJECTIVELY(3) BUT RATHER 'A MANNER OF PROCEEDING' WHICH MAY AVAIL ITSELF OF A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT DEVICES This remarkable process is actually taking place everywhere in our field. Foster has recently given new life to what most of us held to be an exhausted question -the origin of the potter's wheel-by pointing out that an invention is neither simply a new mechanical device, nor a material object that can be described objectively, but rather a manner of proceeding which may avail itself of a number of different devices, some crude and others more elaborate. In the field of social organization, I myself have tried to show that kinship systems should not be described by their external features, such as the number of terms they use or the way they classify, merge, and distinguish all possible ties between individuals. In so doing, all we can hope to obtain is a long, meaningless list of types and subtypes, while if we try to find out how they work, that is, what kind of solidarity they help to establish within the group, their apparent multiplicity is reduced to a few basic and meaningful principles. (Levi-strauss 1966 : 126)

is a matter of perfect indifference. The only question is: Is it true in and for itself'.

It is a matter of perfect indifference where a thing originated... the only question is: Is it true in and for itself' Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

is a problematic concept because there is always more than one source. It redoubles and pluralizes itself, so in the end you have no source at all.

the problem with the origin is that there is always more than one source. it redoubles and pluralizes itself, so in the end you have no source at all. .

is always formulated against a background of the already begun upon which man is able to reflect on what may serve for him as origin.

It is always against a background of the already begun that man is able to reflect on what may serve for him as origin. For man, then, origin is by no means the beginning a sort of dawn of history from which his ulterior acquisitions would have accumulated. Origin, for man, is much more the way in which man in general, any man, articulates himself upon the already-begun of labour, life, and language... it must be sought for in that fold where man in all simplicity applies his labour to a world that has been worked for thousands of years, lives in the freshness of his unique, recent, and precarious existence a life that has its roots in the first organic formations, and composes into sentences which have never before been spoken (even though generation after generation has repeated them) words that arc older than all memory. (Foucault 'orde of thingsr' 330).

is always not-yet, always fresh, always promised in an imminence which is always nearer yet never accomplished. It is 'what thought has yet to think'.

the origin, becoming what thought has yet to think, and always afresh, would be forever promised in an imminence always nearer yet never accomplished. In that case the origin is that which is returning, the repetition towards which thought is moving, the return of that which has already always begun, the proximity of a light that has been shining since the beginning of time. (Foucault 'order of things' 332).

is, by no means, the beginning, but it is the way man articulates himself upon the already-begun of labor, life, and language. It must be sought for in that fold where man in all simplicity applies his labour to a world that has been worked for thousands of years.

It is always against a background of the already begun that man is able to reflect on what may serve for him as origin. For man, then, origin is by no means the beginning a sort of dawn of history from which his ulterior acquisitions would have accumulated. Origin, for man, is much more the way in which man in general, any man, articulates himself upon the already-begun of labour, life, and language... it must be sought for in that fold where man in all simplicity applies his labour to a world that has been worked for thousands of years, lives in the freshness of his unique, recent, and precarious existence a life that has its roots in the first organic formations, and composes into sentences which have never before been spoken (even though generation after generation has repeated them) words that arc older than all memory. (Foucault 'order of thingsr' 330).

is distinguished from both an evolutionary development and a coming-into-being. It demands a dialectical perspective of something involving both the process of becoming and disappearing. It is a whirlpool in the river of becoming, and swallows up the genetic material in its rhythm.

Origin [Ursprung] is therefore distinguished from a merely genetic coming-into-being [Enstehung] and evolutionary development of 'pure history', to include the essential inner history of the 'life of the works and forms' (OGT, 45-7). The 'science of the Origin' is a philosophical history, a history of the essential, whose contemplation enlist a dialectical perspective to grasp the form of the 'original phenomenon': as something subject to a process of becoming and disappearing, and therefore only partial and incomplete. Benjamin once again resorts to an image: 'Origin is a whirlpool in the river of becoming, and swallows up the genetic material in its rhythm' (OGT, 45, translation amended... GS 1.1 226). Criticism attempts to virtually reassemble the foreand after-history [Vorund Nachgeschichte] of the phenomena into a historical constellation, in which the Idea is represented and the phenomena redeemed. This is its messianic function in relation to the historical Absolute. ' (stanford encyclopedia)

is made possible and made a necessity which is both internal and foreign to historicity in its very fabric.

It is no longer origin that gives rise to historicity... it is historicity that, in its very fabric, makes possible the necessity of an origin which must be both internal and foreign to it: like the virtual tip of a cone in which all differences, all dispersions, all discontinuities would be knitted together so as to form no more than a single point of identity, the impalpable figure of the Same, yet possessing the power, nevertheless, to burst open upon itself and become Other. (Foucault 'order of thingsr' 329).

origin, n.All

origin