Definitions HQ

Virtue (n.) as ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠men have it stands farther from the divine standard than human ability does: nature resembles our art more than our justice.

Virtue (n.) and ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠vice are like colours, sounds, heat and cold — not qualities in objects but perceptions in the mind; a mighty discovery that changes almost nothing in practice.

Virtue (n.) once ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠a little practised is always agreeable; superstition is forever odious and burdensome — Ramadan must be harder than any moral duty.

Virtue (n.) of ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠a manly, steady kind is the thing most destructive to superstition: in that calm sunshine of the mind, the spectres of false divinity never appear.

Virtue (n.) of ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the social kind is contagious: it transfuses itself into each beholder and calls forth on its own behalf the very affection it exerts on others.

Virtue (n.) cannot ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠belong to a useful object: a chest of drawers may be as handy as a statesman and as well proportioned as a body, but can we ever be in love with it?

Virtue (n.) at ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠a distance is like a fixed star: to the eye of reason as luminous as the noonday sun, yet so far off it gives neither light nor heat.

Virtue (n.) I ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠love without austerity, pleasure without effeminacy, and life without fearing its end.

Virtue (n.) stripped ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠of the dismal dress divines put on her shows nothing but gentleness and affability — even, at proper intervals, play, frolic and gaiety; austere pretenders she rejects as hypocrites.

Virtue (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠whatever mental action or quality gives a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; vice the contrary.

Virtue (n.) cannot ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠be limited to voluntary qualities, for courage, patience and equanimity depend little or not at all on our choice — yet every language calls them virtues.

Virtue (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠sense and spirit with humanity — for mere good-nature is a fool.

Virtue (n.) did ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not have to be voluntary, the ancients saw: cowardice, folly and impatience are odious though independent of the will — no one can attain every beauty of mind any more than of body.

Virtue (n.) described ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠in a foreign land without names sounds like murder, incest and perjury — and it is only Athens.

Virtue (n.) has ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠never been praised except for being useful or agreeable — for where would be the sense of extolling a character good for nothing?

Virtue (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠praised in every language because the word itself means praise — part of the harmony in morals is merely the nature of language.

Virtue (n.) of ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠every kind can easily be refined away by a false philosophy sifting it with every captious rule of logic.