Emotion (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠like running rather than walking: you started it willingly, but once you try to stop, your legs carry you on.

Emotion (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not being moved by an impression but entrusting yourself to it and following the chance movement through.

Emotion (n.) has ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not happened until you accept that its object really is charged with value and really merits a vigorous response.

Emotion (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠habit-forming: repeated desire grows into greed and repeated fear into timidity, until the smallest provocation sets off a storm.

Anger (n.) indulged ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠often enough can destroy reason itself, leaving a person incapable of anger or any other human feeling.

Anger (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠a sword stuck fast in the enemy's wound: once driven in, it will not come back out.

Anger (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not the movement that rises and then obeys reason; it is the movement that leaps over reason and drags reason along behind it.

Anger (n.) has ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠three movements: an unwilled jolt, a willed judgment that revenge is fitting, and finally a lust for revenge no matter what, where the angry turn brutish.

Grief (n.) has ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠no counterpart in the wise: the only true evils are one's own failings, and a wise person by definition has none freshly arrived.

Grief (n.) should ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠last as long as you believe your loss, yet it fades with time, the puzzle Posidonius pressed against the Stoic account of emotion.

Grief (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠uniquely human: animals cry out for a day or two over missing young, but only people grieve consciously, willfully and at length.

Grief (n.) fades ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠as the loss stops seeming recent; a mind that never makes that adjustment, like the widow Artemisia's, can mourn for the rest of a life.

Fear (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not caused by the enemy camp drawing near but by the belief that defeat is bad and that a looming evil calls for feeling.

Fear (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not the pounding heart, which happy excitement can produce just as well; it is the judgment that something bad is about to happen.

Fear (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠a withdrawing of the spirit: the frightened general retreats like any general, but inside he is shrinking, and the pounding heart is what that feels like.

Fear (n.) waits ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠for the epidemic: parents do not fear their children's death when they reflect that children are mortal, only when they hear the plague has come.

Distress (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠a grim and deadly name that cannot live alongside wisdom, though even the wise feel a bite and a small contraction now and then.

Distress (n.) needs ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠two beliefs at once: that a serious misfortune has happened, and that being upset is the fitting response; take away either and it never arrives.

Distress (n.) over ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠a lost fortune is not a sudden belief that money matters; you believed that already, and what is new is only the news.

Distress (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the mind contracting against reason, set off by a fresh belief that something evil is here and that shrinking from it is fitting.

The Wise (n.) are ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠equipped to feel pain at a present evil, but like burglar alarms in safe neighbourhoods, the mechanism never has to go off.

The Wise (n.) feel ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the jolt of a crashing building like anyone else; the difference is that they do not add belief to the first impression.

The Wise (n.) may ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠feel very strongly and never feel carried away, because they get the response right the first time and have no second thoughts to override.

Love (n.) for ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠a child or a friend should be held like fondness for a goblet: real, but braced for the day the fragile thing breaks.

Love (n.) in ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠full grip is treated like madness: 'let them be,' we say, and no one tries to reason with lovers until they cool.

Love (n.) of ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the wise kind is not desire at all but an effort to form a friendship, prompted by beauty seen as promise of virtue: love is the bloom of virtue.

Apatheia (n.) would ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠make one either a god or a stone, Jerome complained; he was half right, for the wise are godlike but not stony.

Apatheia (n.) would, ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠if it banned every movement of the soul, give the sage the life of a stone, which is exactly what the Stoics did not mean.

Apatheia (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not a ban on every feeling but the absence of emotions as we know them, which leaves room for other kinds of feeling.

Character (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the real cause of what we do: push a cylinder and it rolls, push a cube and it doesn't, so blame the shape, not the push.

Character (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠a trait like a callus: not just a string of reactions but a raised sensitivity, desire at the first hint of profit, hostility at the mere suggestion of company for tea.

Character (n.) can ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠differ from person to person even among those equally short of virtue, as the sea floor varies though all of it lies equally underwater.

Feeling (n.) cannot ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠be a useless gift of nature; to deny the wise all feeling would be like giving people a foot in the middle of the forehead.

Feeling (n.) can ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠come apart from the belief that usually causes it: something may feel exactly like anger or delight and still not be anger or delight.

Feeling (n.) resists ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠description: to say how an emotion feels we either drop into physiology, 'a surge of adrenaline', or reach for metaphor, 'a knot in the stomach'.