Become More Real When Named

Simmer

desire

G.W.F. Hegel

lack

objet petit a

Jacques Lacan

satisfaction

Lord of the Rings

perversion

perversity

Santa Claus

sexual desire

dirty mind

is a curved space. When we confront the object of our desire, more satisfaction is provided by dancing around it than by directly going at it.

the Freudian solution to the antinomy between the subject's approaching or running away from his objects of desire and the 'constant speed' (and distance from him) of the object-cause of desire (objet petit a) resides in the curved space of desire: sometimes (as a rule, even), the shortest way to realize a desire is to by-pass its object-goal, to circulate around it, to postpone its encounter. What Lacan calls objet petit a is the agent of this curving: the unfathomable X on account of which, when we confront the object of our desire, more satisfaction is provided by dancing around it than by directly going at it. (Zizek 'how to read lacan' 65)

is a desire to be recognized by the other and, as such, the desire between the two self-consciousnesses is the same each desires the other to recognize them.

For Hegel desire is a desire to be recognized by the other and, as such, the desire between the two self-consciousnesses is the same each desires the other to recognize them.

is a kind of duty that you are truly responsible for.

lacan says that the only ethical rule admitted by psychoanalysis is 'do not compromise your desire' the only thing the subject may' feel guilty or is compromise his or her desire. What Lacan means is something along the same line is that desire functions as a kind of a duty in the sense again that you are truly responsible. You can never say, Lacon's position is here radically ethically, you can never say 'Sorry, I desired this.' No! You are radically responsible for what you desire.' (zizek)

is a name with a history', which is to say that its status is fundamentally discursive.

The main difference between Foucault's approach and that of the Hegelian tradition (and even psychoanalysis) is that, for Foucault, desire is first and foremost a name with a history in other words, its status is fundamentally discursive. More specifically, Foucault reverses the logic of Hegelian and psychoanalytic accounts of desire that situate it as prior to, and largely constitutive of, culture. We have seen that for Hegel desire facilitates reflexivity and mediates the world, bringing the subject into being. In Freud's work, the law barring incestuous desire is the path that both anchors the subject while splitting it by way of repression: as with the Hegelian tradition, the relationship between desire and sublimation is the mechanism, for Freud, by which civilization supersedes the biological and instinctual. Similarly for Lacan, what Butler refers to as the 'juridical model of power' posits 'a true desire prior to repression, a phenomenon that would, according to Foucault, announce an 'outside' to discourse' (1987: 221). Foucault, however, insist that the concept of desire is something that is only intelligible within, and produced by, discursive practices and formations... in other words, power precedes both desire and the subject.

is a pain which seeks easement through possession.

Desire is a pain which seeks easement through possession. Jack London

is a process of production without reference to any external instance such as lack that would crush it or pleasure that would bring it to an end.

BoW is the the field of immanence of desire, the plane of consistency proper to desire (where desire is defined as a process of production, without reference to any external instance, such as lack that would crush it or pleasure that could bring it to an end..THE BwO is the field where desire can produce freely without end' (Hardt's notes on TP 29)

is a process, as opposed to a structure or a genesis which becomes arranged by the strategic point of pleasure.

Hence, for Deleuze, desire must be the term for what passes into and becomes arranged in the dispositif (although he accepts Foucault's unease at the Lacanian inflection of desire as lack). Deleuze's Spinozist version of desire implies no such negativity: ''For me, desire includes no such lack... it is also not a natural given. Desire is wholly a part of the functioning heterogeneous assemblage. It is a process, as opposed to a structure or a genesis. It is an affect, as opposed to a feeling. It is a haecceity the individual singularity of a day, a season, a life. As opposed to a subjectivity, it is an event, not a thing or a person. Above all, it implies the constitution of a field of immanence or a body-without-organs, which is only defined by zones of intensity, thresholds, degrees and fluxes'' (Deleuze 2006, 130).

is a product of discursive activities that create the space of social reasoning in a given historical period.

To Foucault, desire is a product of discursive activities that create the space of social reasoning in a given historical period. In many respects, while the structuralist emphasis was on signs and their constant movement of referring/deferring to one another, Foucault's penchant was for histories, events, and discursive formations.

desire, n.All

desire