action

thinking

is an ethical concept. The actor can be held responsible for it.

an ethical concept. the actor can be held responsible for it

is bound by a paradox. On the one hand, it is necessary to act prematurely, without objective justification. On the other hand, a simple acting-out or passage a l'acte merely reproduces the ideological coordinates in which it takes place.

The act is bound by a paradox, which is to say it is always divided from itself. On the one hand, it is necessary to act prematurely, without objective justification: 'Like the Lacanian analyst, a political agent has to commit acts that can only be authorized by themselves, for which there is no external guarantee' (54). On the other hand, a simple acting-out or passage a l'acte merely reproduces the ideological coordinates in which it takes place: 'If, today, one follows a direct call to act, this act will not be performed in an empty space it will be an act within the hegemonic ideological coordinates' (238).

is distinguished from mere animal behavior on the basis of consciousness, reflection, intention, purpose, and meaning.

Weber suggested that acts be distinguished from mere (animal) behaviour on the basis of acts being seen to entail a number of features of human rationality: consciousness, reflection, intention, purpose and meaning. (rapport 2000)

is not simply works well within the framework of the existing relations, but changes the very framework that determines how things work.

the political act (intervention) proper is not simply something that works well within the framework of the existing relations, but something that changes the very framework that determines how things work' (Zizek 'risk society' 146).

is paradoxically determined only afterwards on the proverbial 'morning after'. Only then does it become clear what was merely a libertarian pathetic outburst and what was a true revolutionary upheaval.

What is the difference between these two conceptions' How to distinguish a genuine from a false act' In fact, we cannot do so in advance it is for this reason that an act is always premature but only by what occurs afterwards. As Zizek says: 'It is only this reference to what happens after the revolution, the proverbial 'morning after', that allows us to distinguish between libertarian pathetic outbursts and true revolutionary upheavals' (50). That is, it is only in retrospect that objective reasons for the act exist, after the revolution has organized and stabilized itself. But there is a further point here: the ultimate act of any revolution is its imposing of a new order. And it is for this reason that the 'instrumentalization' of the revolution is not to be understood as its sublation or compromise, but as part of the revolution itself, for the revolution does not exist until after it: ' [Revolution] begins with the gesture of radical negativity . . . There then follows a second stage, the invention of a new life not only the construction of a new social reality within which our Utopian dreams would be realized, but the (re)construction of these dreams themselves' (50).

's consequences affect the probability of its occurring again.

The consequences of an act affect the probability of its occurring again. B. F. Skinner

act, n.All

act