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jargon

confusion

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G.W.F. Hegel

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is a character of certain literary styles which sometimes allow us to think what the philosophical theory of writing sometimes misapprehends, what it sometimes violently prohibits.

certain literary or poetic simulacra sometimes allow us to think what the philosophical theory of writign misapprehends, what it sometimes violently prohibits' (derrida points 79)

is a necessity in the advanced skill of philosophizing just as a complex and laborious program of learning and practice is necessary for competence in shoe making. Though not everyone is able to make shoes, why when it comes to philosophy, should one immediately be able to philosophize'.

In the case ofall other sciences, arts, skills) and crafts, everyone is convinced that a complex and laborious programme of learning and practice is necessary for competence. Yet when..it comes to<philosophy, there seems to be a currently prevailing prejudice to the effect that, although not everyone who has eyes and fingers, and is given leather and last, is at once in a position to make shoes, everyone nevertheless immediately understi:lnds how to philosophize, and how to evaluate philosophy, since he possesses the criterion for doing so in his natural reasoo'-'-as if he did not likewise possess the measure for a shoe in his own foot. (hegel 'phenomenology' 41)

is a presentation of ideas that is difficult in direct proportion to how things are in reality in fact difficult. Lacan is not looking for transparency, but trying, first of all, to stick to what we find in our experience, and if it's not transparent, well that's too bad.

You will say that I am now advancing something that is no more transparent for that. But I'm not looking for transparency, I am trying, first of all, to stick to what we find in our experience, and if it's not transparent, well that's too bad. (lacan 'my teaching' : 41)

is a technical language which the phenomenologist is left to develop. It is a 'nonworldly language', still opaque to the natural attitude.

The second paradox the paradox of the phenomenological statement is closely connected to the rst. As Fink says, 'the phenomenologist who desires to communicate has only worldly concepts at his disposal' (PP 154/143).22 In regard to mundane languages, the phenomenologist can take two tacks. On the one hand, he can try to reduce the mundane meanings of the words he must use. But in order to do this, he has to use other mundane expressions... thus he cannot eliminate the mundane meanings entirely. On the other hand, the phenomenologist can try to develop a technical language, a, so to speak, 'nonworldly language.' Yet, being entirely different from worldly languages, such a technical language would be entirely opaque to someone still residing in the natural attitude. In order then to explicate the technical meanings for the natural attitude person, one would have to resort to mundane expressions. Therefore mundane meanings would attach themselves to the technical terms. As Fink says, 'Phenomenological statements necessarily contain an internal con®ict between a word's mundane meaning and the transcendental meaning which it serves to indicate' (PP 154/144).23 The expression of transcendental knowledge, therefore, is in constant danger... those still in the natural attitude can always misunderstand what the phenomenologist wants to say. This danger is why Fink in a later essay laments that Husserl never re®ected on the possibility of a transcendental language.24 (Lawlor 2002 : 20)

is an activity whereby clarity in achieve precisely by not trying to be so clear. The reason for this is that examples distract the attention, dissipate the mental power of the reader, and stand in the way of his forming a clear conception of the whole.

On the other hand, as regards the comprehensibility of a system of speculative cognition, connected under a single principle, we may say with equal justice: many a book would have been much clearer, if it had not been intended to be so very clear. For explanations and examples, and other helps to intelligibility, aid us in the comprehension of parts, but they distract the attention, dissipate the mental power of the reader, and stand in the way of his forming a clear conception of the whole... as he cannot attain soon enough to a survey of the system, and the colouring and embellishments bestowed upon it prevent his observing its articulation or organizationwhich is the most important consideration with him, when he comes to judge of its unity and stability. (Kant 'critique of pure reason' : 9)

is at times the peddling of subtlety in place of art because modern authors have nothing to say.

Some, such as Julien Benda, have even drawn the conclusion that modern writers are 'byzantine', are difficult simply because they have nothing to say and peddle subtlety in place of art. (merleau-ponty 'the world of perception : 49)

is language constructed in such a way to make it as hard as possible to reinsert technocratic biases back into philosophy.

Technocratic culture does not want us to go near Heidegger or to go into these other regions. And that's why Heidegger is so hard to read. With utmost prudence he stripped his language of traditional philosophical assumptions and made it as hard as possible to reinsert biases back into his philosophy. He did this out of a profound sense of what mankind needs most of all an understanding of how narrow the present clearing is in which we work, relate to one another, and press forward without real goals for the sake of more efficiency. So reading Heidegger was rough and maybe impossible for most of us until Dreyfus showed up. (Delany 1992:47)

is like in that joke where the old man went to a talk. When he came home, is son asked, 'what did the man say'' The old man replied, 'he didn't say'.

My wife's elderly uncle recently went to a meeting and heard a speech. When he came home, someone asked, 'what did the man say'' The old man replied, 'He didn't say.'

jargon, n.All

jargon