178 definitions
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Jacques Derrida: top 200 quotes
178 definitions
Love (n.) is defined through the difference between loving someone (for who they are) and loving something about that someone (or loving someone for what they are).
Love (n.) is intimately tied to death. It is to be found in the realization that the one who is loved (and thus who is a piece of us), will die, sparking a kind of furtural mourning in the present for both that person, and by extension, also for us ourselves.
Love (n.) is precisely that which forces us to recognize that the living present has always already been disrupted, so that the experience of love is living through what can't be experienced, if experience is restricted to an event recorded in a supposedly self-present living present.
Love (n.) is the acceptance of the necessary possibility of mourning the other.
Absence (n.) is a genuine absence and not merely an absence of what is present even if what is present is truly absent... it is rather the absence of both absence and presence.
Absence (n.) is not derivative of presence, but instead presence is derivative of absence.
Absence (n.) is the space in which humankind creates itself as the representation of representation, as the possibility of writing.
A Decision (n.) is a decision because it can never be wholly justified.
A Decision (n.) only counts as a decision if it makes a leap, or reaches beyond rationality and calculative reasoning.
Trauma (n.) is a character of all events. Either an event is traumatic or it does not happen.
Trauma (n.) is a condition tied to memory oriented not backward to what happened, but turned toward what is coming, what is arriving, what is happening tomorrow.
Trauma (n.) is able to take the form of a traumatic memory of something yet to happen a future anterior recollection of a messianic, apocalyptic, or traumatic memory that defies the arrow of aristotelian time.
Trauma (n.) is necessarily at work in any event. An event must be traumatic or it does not happen. It must be unappropriable, indeterminable, or it cannot arrive.
Representation (n.) is the impulse which takes events to be capable of being repeated, substituted and/or communicated. It runs counter to the sense that experience is a series of entirely unique (and thus ungraspable) events.
Life (n.) is the voice that hears itself. It is a self-relation, the originary opening as a promise.
Truth (n.) is not, as with heidegger, the idea of coming-into-presence, but rather is identified always with presence.
Time (n.) is all we have (to give), and thus 'in giving all one's time, one gives all or the all'.
Time (n.) is dislocated and disjointed, yet not as 'a time whose joinings are negated, broken, mistreated, dysfunctional, disadjusted, according to a dys of negative opposition and dialectical disjunction, but a time without certain joining or determinable conjunction.
Time (n.) is not a thing, it is not part of temporality so, even our experience of time as a succession of temporal presents is already an annulment of time.
Time (n.) is not the absolute form but rather the absolute non-form... genealogy attempts to make us forget the form of the present in order to remember the 'non-place'.
Time (n.) is not the aristotelian measure of movement or the augustinian psychological extension, but rather the passing away without trace and without expectation of reciprocation.
Time (n.) is now and the future cannot be anticipated because calculation would negate its promise and, consequently, its 'advent' or 'event'.
Time (n.) is without being and is never simply present. It is neither an object nor a given. Yet we can apprehend time only through what it is not, namely, the objects that fill its form.
Writing (n.) always leads to more writing, and more, and still more just as history does not lead to absolute knowledge but to more history.