Ludwig WittgensteinThinkers

Action (n.) gains ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠its meaning not from 'inner' accompaniments, but from its place within the background of regular practices, techniques and customs of a community. As we are initiated into a communal life-world, we become tuned in to those ways of responding that make up the background of intelligibility embodied in the 'common ways of acting'.

Aesthetics (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the same as ethics.

Affect (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠(not a term Wittgenstein uses but he poses a question very relevant to affect discourse): 'When I see someone being killed-- is it simply what I see that makes an impression on me or does it come with the hypothesis that someone is being killed here''.

A Belief (n.) cannot ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠be doubted. It concerns not metaphysical truths, but the grammatical impossibility of certain sentences. One, for example, cannot say: 'It is raining and I do not believe it'.

Color (n.) could ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠conceivably be differentiated based on luster, such that shiny black and matt black would different color names.

A Concept (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not a mental object, but the topography of a word's uses.

Death (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not an event in life: We do not live to experience death. If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present.

Description (n.) must ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠take the place of explanation.

Doubt (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠that which we must have grounds for just as we do for belief. We do not have grounds to doubt 'I know I have a brain'.