386 definitions
The book's index
Eichmann in Jerusalem
259 concepts · 386 definitions
- accomplice1
- act of state2
- Adolf Eichmann12
- alibi1
- anonymity1
- antisemitism5
- Anton Schmidt1
- archive1
- assembly line1
- assimilation1
- asylum1
- atrocity1
- auflockerung1
- Auschwitz1
- banality1
- banality of evil3
- barbarism1
- belligerent1
- betrayal1
- boredom1
- bragging1
- bribery1
- bureaucracy1
- businessman1
- career2
- categorical imperative2
- citizenship1
- civil servant1
- civil service1
- cliche4
- clown1
- cog1
- collaboration1
- collective guilt2
- compassion1
- competition1
- compliance1
- complicity1
- confession1
- conscience13
- consistency1
- conspiracy1
- conviction1
- cooperation1
- corruption2
- court2
- court of the victors1
- crime1
- crime against humanity5
- criminal1
- culture1
- custom1
Conscience (n.) in Eichmann would have troubled him only if he had not done what he was ordered — to ship millions to their death with great zeal and meticulous care.
Conscience (n.) in Eichmann's case functioned in the expected way for about four weeks, whereupon it began to function the other way around.
Conscience (n.) was soothed in Eichmann by the simplest fact: he could see no one, no one at all, who was actually against the Final Solution.
Conscience (n.) made Eichmann uncompromising in the last year of the war, not fanaticism — the sad and uncomfortable truth.
Adolf Eichmann (n.) offered 'no exceptions' as proof that he had always acted against his inclinations and done his duty — the rigor that damned him in the judges' eyes justified him in his own.
Adolf Eichmann (n.) becomes a symbol, sought in every one of us — and consistency then demands we grant his own plea that he was only a scapegoat for mankind and original sin.
Adolf Eichmann (n.) boasted of good order in killing — if it had to be done, better done in order — and Rumania, where S.S. men intervened against butchery so the killing could be 'civilized,' makes one wonder.
Adolf Eichmann (n.) baffled the prosecution as a mass murderer who never killed — so it kept trying to prove individual murder against a man who probably lacked the guts to kill.
Genocide (n.) is an attack upon human diversity as such — upon a characteristic of the human status without which 'mankind' or 'humanity' would be devoid of meaning.
Genocide (n.) is not murder on a larger scale: state-employed mass murderers must be prosecuted because they violated the order of mankind, not because they killed millions — an altogether different order is broken.
Genocide (n.) appeared to the Jews, thinking in terms of their own history, not as the newest crime but as the oldest crime they remembered — a misunderstanding at the root of all the trial's failures.
Genocide (n.) is better named administrative massacre, which dispels the prejudice that such acts are done only to a foreign race: Hitler began with Germany's 'incurably ill,' and the principle of selection depends only on circumstance.
Judgment (n.) was what saved the few, not old values or religion: they decided each case as it arose, freely, because no rules existed for the unprecedented.
Judgment (n.) he exercised fully as the law asked of Eichmann: he examined each order for its 'manifest' legality, namely regularity, and had no need of conscience, since he knew his country's laws.
Judgment (n.) is what we demanded of the accused: to tell right from wrong with nothing to guide them but their own judgment, completely at odds with the unanimous opinion of all those around them.
Judgment (n.) in these trials was free: judges really passed sentence on the monstrous deeds alone, and only leaned on standards and precedents to justify it.
Antisemitism (n.) explains only the choice of victims, not the nature of the crime: extermination was a crime against humanity perpetrated upon the body of the Jewish people.
Antisemitism (n.) in Italy was unpopular because an anti-Jewish measure 'raised a problem which fortunately did not exist.'
Antisemitism (n.) blinded its own victims once believed eternal and ubiquitous: thinking all Gentiles alike, they could not tell friend from foe.
Antisemitism (n.) keeps its decent Jew: 'eighty million good Germans, each of whom has his decent Jew. It is clear, the others are pigs, but this particular Jew is first-rate.'
A Crime against humanity (n.) is the understatement of the century when translated as a crime against Menschlichkeit, human kindness — as though the Nazis had simply lacked kindness.
A Crime against humanity (n.) differs from 'inhuman acts' undertaken for some known, if criminal, purpose like colonization: its intent and purpose were unprecedented, explicable by no utilitarian aim.
A Crime against humanity (n.) is not an excess in the pursuit of war but a policy of systematic murder independent of war, to be continued in peace — the only crime the tu-quoque argument could not touch.
A Crime against humanity (n.) is a crime against mankind committed on the body of a particular people — not a crime against that people alone.
Deportation (n.) in its first cases was a test case, an experiment in catastrophe: could Jews be made to walk to their doom on their own feet, carrying their own little valises, in the middle of the night — and would the neighbors care?
Deportation (n.) had to be forever: a priest-led government demanded a guarantee that Jews taken by the Germans would stay in the East and never return to Slovakia.
Deportation (n.) looked like this from Berlin in 1943: 'Day in day out the people here leave for their own funeral.'
Deportation (n.) routed each trainload of Jews by absorptive capacity — the bureaucratic measure of the number a killing installation could handle.
Memory (n.) in Eichmann kept only the Jews who had been completely in his power.
Memory (n.) in Eichmann kept the turning points of his own career and every elating sentence, but not the turning points of history or of extermination.
Memory (n.) in Eichmann ran on a separate tape for each story, and the tape proved proof against reason, argument, information, and insight of any kind.
Memory (n.) in Eichmann was a storehouse of human-interest stories of the worst type: of a trip to arrange deportations, he remembered only bowling with a Minister.
A Cliche (n.) is the most reliable of all safeguards against the words and presence of others, and hence against reality as such.
A Cliche (n.) such as 'ghetto mentality,' German collective guilt or Jewish collective innocence makes judgment superfluous, and uttering it is devoid of all risk.
A Cliche (n.) is what any sentence of Eichmann's own became: when he did construct one, he repeated it until it was a cliché.
A Cliche (n.) was Eichmann's horrible gift for consoling himself, and it did not leave him in the hour of his death.
Guilt (n.) is quite gratifying to feel if you haven't done anything wrong — how noble! — whereas admitting real guilt and repenting is hard and depressing.
Guilt (n.) felt without having done anything specific is morally hardly less wrong than feeling free of guilt when one is actually guilty.
Guilt (n.) felt by German youth was to Eichmann a landmark like the first man on the moon — so he offered to hang himself publicly to lift the burden from the innocent young. Empty talk, but elating.
Guilt (n.) and innocence before the law are objective: even if eighty million Germans had done as you did, it would not have excused you.