The Animal (n.) became, in Descartes, an automaton of flesh and blood — because it resembles automatons that resemble humans.
An Animal (n.) resembles us wholly in every function that goes on without thinking — and in none of those that depend on thought alone.
An Animal (n.) cannot think like us, for then it would have an immortal soul — and no one will grant one to oysters and sponges.
An Animal (n.) is, for Descartes, an individual made wholly of one automatism; a human needs two, and nobody can say how they join.
An Animal (n.) does many things better than we do — which only proves it works by mechanism, like a clock that keeps time better than our judgement.
An Animal (n.) perceives the wax just as we first did; only a human mind can strip it of its clothes and consider it naked.
The Animal (n.) is a sheer physical machine, so screams of pain from a monkey are no better than the squeaking gears of a machine that has not been properly oiled.
An Animal (n.) is a machine because it is imprisoned in its own constitution — that animals have never spoken to man proves they do not speak among themselves.
An Animal (n.) would tell us its thoughts if it had any, just as dogs tell us their passions; no animal has ever signed to another about something unconnected with its passions.