Concept (n.) in Hegel is not a label we stick on the world but the ground plan the world was laid out by.
A Concept (n.) in Hegel's Logic is already a unity of being and self, and so carries an unrest that pushes it to annul itself.
Concept (n.) in Hegel is just the spiritual subject seen as rational necessity: it does not describe things but posits them.
Concept (n.) can also mean a thing in germ: Hegel's own age was a birth whose new period had so far only shown its concept.
Concept (n.) develops the way a plant grows: an undifferentiated seed that has the power, indeed the necessity, to produce the particular out of itself.
Concept (n.) for Hegel is not a tool for grasping reality, nor an abstraction from similar cases, but an active principle that makes reality what it is and produces its own particulars.
A Concept (n.) cannot stand alone: we have no concept of a thing if we can say nothing about it but apply that one word, which is the point of Wittgenstein's private-language argument.