A Concept (n.) is a normative idea: A damaged or defective horse is not fully a horse, and an infant or a seed are only 'in concept' and have not fully realized their concept.
A Concept (n.) is not a representation but an act of seizing or the grasping-together of opposites as a kind of movement in logical thinking.
A Concept (n.) is not as kant believes, a mental entity, but rather an entity within 'logical space'.
The Concept (n.) is not merely an instrument we can use to master the outside world. Rather, it is the element where our thought moves... the concept is that to which 'our thinking that must accommodate itself.
A Concept (n.) is not sharply distinct from objects: The concept's 'constitute' rather than simply 'qualify' the objects that exemplify them.
The Concept (n.) is not sharply distinct from the 'I'. To say that concepts are a means used by the understanding in thinking is like saying that chewing and swallowing food is merely a means to eating.
The Concept (n.) is paradoxically such that the supposed contrast between concepts and external objects is itself a concept (or a conceptual construction). The concept necessarily overreaches what is other than itself.
The Concept (n.) is that without which there could be no 'I' nor any understanding, and somewhat circularly, without the concept one could not abstract concepts or conceptions from sensory data.
The Concept (n.) is responsible for shaping what the world is for interpretive communities. There is no way to separate the world as it is from the world as it seems to us.