Logic (n.) is always defeated by itself, that is to say, by the insignificance of the cases on which it thrives.
Logic (n.) is concerned not with the 'recognition of the true' but to show and work out the 'complications' in our thinking. It is concerned not with moving between true sentences, but with the creation of new concepts.
Logic (n.) is concerned not with the 'recognition of the true' but with the 'creation of concepts'.
Logic (n.) is concerned to show and work out the 'complications' in our thinking. It is not about recognizing or calculating the true, but with complicating, surprising.
Logic (n.) is, for the Stoics, if conceived as a machine, not a calculating or computing machine, but rather a sort of 'complicating' machine, moving between usual distinctions, surprising us, attaining an irreducible disparity.
Logic (n.) is, for the Stoics, neither deductive or inductive not even propositional. It is a logic for a kind of conceptual art to deal with what is happening to us. Logic is not an inferential structure but an experience and an activity of thought.
Logic (n.) is, for the Stoics, not about truth and proposition, but about 'sense and event.' It is a logic for the practical question of how to accept fate and how not be unworthy of what happens to us.